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An Insurance-Based Typology of
Police Misconduct
John Rappaport†

ABSTRACT
Not all police misconduct is the same, and different institutional regimes might
manage different sorts of misconduct most effectively. This Article surveys the
universe of police malfeasance from the perspective of an important but
underappreciated regulatory regime: liability insurance. Nearly all but the very
largest municipalities buy insurance that covers claims alleging police misconduct.
In assuming the financial risk of bad police behavior, the insurers become
motivated to prevent it. Criminal procedure scholarship almost entirely overlooks
the salutary regulatory influence these insurers may have on police activity. Yet
insurance is no panacea. Indeed, a principal aim of this Article is to probe the
limits of the insurance mechanism—the places where the effects of insurance on
policing are likely weak or even perverse. This exercise points us toward a typology
of misconduct, along with a corresponding set of plausible approaches for reducing
the occurrence of each of the types identified. In particular, the Article
distinguishes varieties of police misconduct based on (1) the dollar-value of the
legal claims to which they give rise and (2) the length of the delay between when
the misconduct occurs and when a legal claim is typically filed. The typology
suggests, among other things, that the insurance regime is a plausible surrogate
for some governmental regulation of police violence but not, at present, of the sorts
of misconduct that lead to wrongful convictions.

I. INTRODUCTION
Not all police misconduct is the same, and different institutional
regimes might combat different sorts of misconduct most effectively.
This Article surveys the universe of police misconduct from the
perspective of an important but underappreciated regulatory regime:
liability insurance. Most small and mid-sized municipalities in the
United States purchase insurance that covers a range of police
misconduct claims, from improper service of process to outright assault

† Assistant Professor of Law, The University of Chicago Law School. Thanks to Ken
Abraham, Will Baude, and Joanna Schwartz for helpful conversations and feedback on drafts.
Scott Henney provided excellent research assistance. The Darelyn A. & Richard C. Reed Memorial
Fund furnished financial support.
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and battery, discrimination, and other civil rights violations.1 In
assuming the financial risk of bad police behavior, the insurers become
motivated to marshal their substantial resources to prevent it.
Criminal procedure scholarship almost entirely overlooks the salutary
“regulatory” influence these insurers may have on police activity, often
reasoning, mistakenly, as though little or nothing stands between
judicial opinions or statutes and officer discretion.2 Understanding how
insurers regulate the police to reduce liability and defense costs is
crucial in grasping how civil rights lawsuits deter police misconduct.
Yet insurance is no panacea. Indeed, a principal aim of this Article
is to probe the limits of the insurance mechanism—the places where
the effects of insurance on policing are likely weak or even perverse,
suggesting a need for insurance reform or other, more familiar
regulatory interventions. These include domains in which moral
hazard—that is, the propensity of insurance to reduce the insured’s
incentives to prevent harm—seems most likely to predominate. By
laying these cases alongside those in which regulation-by-insurance
appears to function well, I show how thinking about police misconduct
through the lens of liability insurance points us toward a typology of
misconduct, along with a corresponding set of plausible approaches for
reducing the incidence of each of the types identified. My typology
suggests, among other things, that the insurance regime is a plausible
surrogate for some governmental regulation of police violence but not—
at least not yet—of the sorts of misconduct that lead to wrongful
convictions.
To construct my typology, I distinguish types of police misconduct
along two dimensions. First, I consider the dollar value of the legal
claims to which each type of misconduct typically gives rise.3 Low-

1

“Municipality” and “police,” as used here, include both city- and county-level entities and
law enforcement officers.
2
I describe the phenomenon of police “regulation-by-insurance” in detail in other work. See
John Rappaport, How Private Insurers Regulate Public Police, 130 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming
2017),
http: //papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2733783
[https: //perma.cc /2EC3SBHE]. For two of the very few other legal academic papers to touch on insurance, see Joanna C.
Schwartz, How Governments Pay: Lawsuits, Budgets, and Police Reform, 63 UCLA L. REV. 1144
(2016) [hereinafter Schwartz, How Governments Pay]; Joanna C. Schwartz, Who Can Police the
Police?, 2016 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 437; see also CHARLES R. EPP, MAKING RIGHTS REAL 115–37 (2009)
(studying insurance among numerous factors that might influence “legalized accountability” by
police agencies); Candace McCoy, How Civil Rights Lawsuits Improve American Policing, in
HOLDING POLICE ACCOUNTABLE 111, 112 (Candace McCoy ed., 2010) (asserting that “insurance
companies [have] demanded that police improve their policies and practices in adherence to
constitutional requirements and thus avoid monetary payouts to injured citizens”).
3
For a different typology that also sorts civil rights claims according to their dollar value,
see Paul D. Reingold, Requiem for Section 1983, 3 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 13 (2008)
(organizing claims by dollar value and substantive strength).
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dollar-value claims are poor fodder for civil damages suits and, indeed,
rarely arise in that posture. Instead, criminal defendants assert these
claims defensively, to resist prosecution. As a class, these claims pose
little threat to insurers. Insurers therefore have little incentive to
regulate the underlying conduct. High-dollar claims, in contrast, create
sufficient financial incentive to induce potential plaintiffs—and
plaintiffs’ attorneys—to sue. They give insurers reason to pay
attention. This does not mean, however, that civil damages suits work
equally well to deter all types of high-dollar misconduct. A second
crucial consideration is the length of time between the occurrence of
misconduct and the filing of a lawsuit. In insurance parlance, a claim of
police misconduct may have either a “short tail” or a “long tail.”4 Longtail claims, I will explain, pose great difficulties for insurers, and there
are reasons to doubt that insurers are effectively managing the risks
that give rise to these claims.
These two criteria—the size of a claim’s expected payout and the
length of its tail—generate four categories of police misconduct. The
Article’s structure is accordingly straightforward: In each of the four
sections that follow, I describe one category of misconduct along with a
corresponding set of potential solutions. I begin in Part II with highdollar, short-tail claims. The archetype here is a claim that alleges the
use of excessive force. When a police officer employs unlawful force, the
harm he inflicts is often substantial (high-dollar)—especially where
death results—and also immediately apparent and actionable (shorttail). Drawing on original qualitative research of the police liability
insurance industry, I explain how insurers work to manage the problem
of police violence and suggest why they may fare better in some regards
than traditional sources of regulation.5 The potentially provocative
4

“Long-tail claims are those which are not brought (or if brought, not resolved) for some
years after the action by the defendant that gives rise to the claim.” Kenneth S. Abraham,
Environmental Liability and the Limits of Insurance, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 942, 964 n.69 (1988). In
practice, legal claims lie on a spectrum, ordered by the length of their tail; the trait is continuous,
not binary.
5
In my initial research for Rappaport, supra note 2, I conducted thirty-three semistructured
telephone interviews, mostly with members of the industry who were high-ranking officials within
their respective firms. I located my subjects using a “snowball sampling” technique. See, e.g., JOHN
LOFLAND ET AL., ANALYZING SOCIAL SETTINGS: A GUIDE TO QUALITATIVE OBSERVATION AND
ANALYSIS 43 (4th ed. 2006) (discussing “snowball” or “chain-referral” sampling: “a method for
generating a field sample of individuals possessing the characteristics of interest by asking initial
contacts if they could name a few individuals with similar characteristics who might agree to be
interviewed”). My interview subjects were geographically diverse, including representatives of
firms in every time zone and consultants who travel the country. I followed up on some of these
interviews with targeted questions via email or a quick additional telephone call, which I did not
count toward the total thirty-three. I also attended the 2015 annual conferences of the Association
of Governmental Risk Pools and the International Association of Chiefs of Police. For this
Article—in particular for the research in Part III—I requested additional telephone interviews
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implication is that, despite present political pressure to develop publiclaw solutions to police violence, limited government resources may be
better spent fighting other kinds of law enforcement misconduct. To be
clear, I do not suggest that private regulation by insurers can or should
substitute for all public regulation of police use of force—only that, if
public regulatory resources are scarce, we might direct them elsewhere
and let insurers, where they operate, shoulder some of the load in this
domain.
In Part III I turn to high-dollar, long-tail claims. Here I have in
mind “wrongful conviction” claims filed by individuals who have been
imprisoned and later exonerated of criminal wrongdoing. The average
exoneree spends over thirteen years wrongfully incarcerated (long-tail).
Damages for this sort of harm can be immense (high-dollar). Not all
wrongful conviction claims allege police misconduct, but many do. And
when they do, they typically fall within the standard police liability
policy. Insurers, therefore, have a financial incentive to prevent the
kinds of misconduct that lead to wrongful convictions. But the long tail
creates complications that make the risk difficult for insurers to price
and manage. The relative infrequency of the claims exacerbates these
challenges. In this context, insurers may actually make things worse
rather than better by creating (but not controlling) moral hazard. And
because the rate of exonerations is rising,6 it is reasonable to fear that
wrongful conviction cases will, before too long, disrupt this corner of the
liability insurance market. With an eye on this possibility, I suggest
two sets of reforms—one focused on improving the insurability of the
underlying risk and the other on alternative, non-insurance-based
regulatory mechanisms for reducing police malfeasance that leads to
wrongful convictions.
The third and fourth categories of police misconduct in my typology
are largely—though not entirely—outside insurers’ purview. I therefore
deal with them more quickly. The third category, addressed in Part IV,
contains low-dollar, short-tail claims. This includes many run-of-themill violations of law, like an investigatory stop unjustified by
reasonable suspicion or the failure to give Miranda warnings before
custodial interrogation.7 Although the harm from these interactions
manifests immediately (short-tail), it is largely non-compensable in the
eyes of the law (low-dollar). To police these violations, we rely heavily

with the relevant experts who had been most helpful during the first round of interviews; I ended
up speaking with eight of them. I ceased interviewing new subjects when responses became
repetitious.
6
See sources cited infra note 76.
7
See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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on criminal defendants to act as private attorneys general, and on the
occasional suit for injunctive relief. These tools undoubtedly help, but
more is needed. Drawing on prior work,8 I suggest how we might
reorient some of our constitutional doctrine to focus defendants’ claims
on systemic rather than individualized concerns.
The last category, the topic of Part V, involves low-dollar, long-tail
claims. It is not immediately obvious what, if anything, belongs in this
box. But I will make the case that one unique type of claim plausibly
does, at least some of the time: a claim alleging racial profiling by the
police. Under extant doctrine, absent a smoking gun, a colorable
profiling claim must marshal statistical evidence from a broad sample
of other cases. This creates, in many cases, a delay (i.e., a long tail)
between the profiling and the potential lawsuit brought to challenge
it—a delay that distinguishes these claims from mine-run (short-tail)
constitutional violations. And here too, even a successful plaintiff is
unlikely to recover much in damages (low-dollar). The unfortunate
upshot, I think, is that neither civil-damages actions nor criminal
litigation will work very well to combat racial profiling. Recourse to
more traditional forms of regulation, like legislation and administrative
rules, is therefore necessary. Criminal procedure doctrine might be refashioned to encourage this political regulation, I will suggest, but I do
not think that doctrine alone can save the day.
Figure 1 pulls together the strands of the typology:
High-dollar

Low-dollar

Short-tail

Use of force

Terry;
Miranda

Long-tail

Wrongful
convictions

Racial
profiling

Figure 1

8

(2015).

See John Rappaport, Second-Order Regulation of Law Enforcement, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 205
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This model, of course, is only one of myriad schemes we could
sketch to organize the universe of police misconduct. Those with
different frameworks or objectives might demarcate categories along
different dimensions. My approach is useful because it tells us
something about what solutions are likely to gain traction on each type
of misconduct. But it is not the only way to think about the topic.
Two caveats are necessary before proceeding. First, in my
descriptive case—that is, in determining how to classify different types
of police misconduct—I take legal doctrine on liability and damages as
given. This is why I refer to claims as “high-dollar” and “low-dollar”
rather than “high-value” and “low-value”: I mean to convey nothing
about the normative value of different claims, only their dollar value
under legal precedent. Second, I largely obscure the distinction among
different types of insurance providers. As I explain elsewhere, although
most municipalities purchase police liability insurance on the market,
that market is segmented between commercial insurers and
intergovernmental risk pools.9 And the largest municipalities tend to
“self-insure.” In large municipalities that take self-insurance seriously,
and replicate in house much of what market insurers do, the distinction
between self-insurance and market insurance may be inconsequential.
But where “self-insurance” really just means “going bare”—which may
be the typical case10—what I say about the influence of insurance on
policing likely does not apply, at least not in full. Unfortunately, too
little is known about municipal self-insurance for police liability to
permit any confident generalizations, which is why I do not separately
analyze self-insured and market-insured municipalities.
My primary aim is to help organize and systematize our thinking
about how to police the police. Even those who disagree with the
specifics of my typology, I hope, will take away two thematic points:
First, “police misconduct” is a capacious and variegated concept, and
strategies that are necessary or effective to combat one kind of

9

A risk pool is a nonprofit, mission-driven organization formed by a group of local
government entities, usually within one state, to finance a risk, typically by pooling or sharing
that risk. The entities themselves ordinarily own and govern the pool. See Rappaport, supra note 2
(manuscript at 21–22); see generally Jason E. Doucette, Note, Wading in the Pool: Interlocal
Cooperation in Municipal Insurance and the State Regulation of Public Entity Risk Sharing
Pools—A Survey, 8 CONN. INS. L.J. 533, 541–42 (2002).
10
See, e.g., CAROL A. ARCHBOLD, POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY, RISK MANAGEMENT, AND LEGAL
ADVISING 25 (2004) (concluding, based on survey results, that “risk management programs are still
in the infancy stage of being embraced by police agencies”); Joanna C. Schwartz, Introspection
Through Litigation, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1055, 1095–1101 (2015) (reviewing evidence that few
police departments have risk managers); Joanna C. Schwartz, Myths and Mechanics of Deterrence:
The Role of Lawsuits in Law Enforcement Decisionmaking, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1023 (2010) (finding
that the largest police agencies only rarely learn from lawsuits filed against them or their officers).
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misconduct may not be necessary or effective to fight another. Second,
one cannot fully understand how our legal system does and can deter
police misconduct without understanding the role that liability insurers
play in that endeavor, both for good and ill.
II. HIGH-DOLLAR, SHORT-TAIL
Fourth Amendment doctrine prohibits the police from employing
excessive force in effecting a search or seizure.11 Police who violate this
stricture may be ordered to pay compensation for personal injuries they
inflict. Damages, especially in cases involving debilitating injury or
death, can be quite high; lawsuits stemming from recent high-profile
officer-involved deaths have settled for around five or six million dollars
each.12 And the types of injuries these cases involve typically manifest,
and are actionable, immediately after the misconduct occurs. Those two
characteristics make use-of-force claims high-dollar, short-tail claims.
Because the financial stakes can be so high—and because the use
of excessive force is typically not causally related to the discovery of
incriminating evidence—use-of-force claims are usually litigated in civil
suits rather than defensively through suppression motions in criminal
cases.13 Scholars have raised serious questions about how well civil
rights suits work to deter police misconduct, and to restrain the use of
force in particular.14 Some point out, for example, that “excessive force
11

See, e.g., Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989); Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
See, e.g., Monica Davey, Chicago Pays $5 Million over Killing of Teenager, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 16, 2015, at A15 (reporting $5 million settlement in death of Laquan McDonald); Richard
Fausset, Settlement Reached in Shooting by Officer, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2015, at A24 (reporting
$6.5 million settlement in death of Walter Scott); Sheryl Gay Stolberg, University of Cincinnati to
Pay $5 Million to Family in Killing by Police, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2016, at A16 (reporting $4.85
million payout in death of Samuel DuBose, which “appears in line with other recent settlements of
cases involving police officers”); Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Baltimore Announces $6.4 Million Settlement
in the Death of Freddie Gray, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2015, at A20 (reporting $6.4 million settlement
in death of Freddie Gray, which “[l]egal specialists said . . . was in line with settlements for recent
racially charged police misconduct cases,” including Eric Garner, whose estate settled for $5.9
million).
13
See Nancy Leong, Making Rights, 92 B.U. L. REV. 405, 425 (2012) (finding that “98% of
excessive force claims are litigated in the civil context”); see also id. at 441 (asserting that criminal
“courts routinely ignore the use of force in analyzing the legality of an investigative stop”).
14
See, e.g., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., FAIRNESS AND EFFECTIVENESS IN
POLICING 278–80 (Wesley Skogan & Kathleen Frydl eds., 2004); Oren Bar-Gill & Barry Friedman,
Taking Warrants Seriously, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1609, 1626–34 (2012); Richard Emery & Ilann
Margalit Maazel, Why Civil Rights Lawsuits Do Not Deter Police Misconduct: The Conundrum of
Indemnification and a Proposed Solution, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 587 (2000); Diana Hassel, Living
a Lie: The Cost of Qualified Immunity, 64 MO. L. REV. 123, 145 n.106 (1999); Daryl J. Levinson,
Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI.
L. REV. 345 (2000); Daniel J. Meltzer, Deterring Constitutional Violations by Law Enforcement
Officials: Plaintiffs and Defendants as Private Attorneys General, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 247, 283–86
(1988); Joanna C. Schwartz, Police Indemnification, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 885 (2014). But see, e.g.,
12
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doctrine is extraordinarily abstract.”15 “This uncertainty in legal
authority,” one commentator argues, “results in a lack of institutional
guidance and leaves police officers to exercise their own discretion.”16
I take no issue with the premise that excessive force doctrine is
abstract and uncertain. But it does not follow that police officers have
free rein. That conclusion follows only if we ignore other sources of
police regulation, including (though certainly not limited to) regulationby-insurance. The standard police liability policy, however, covers
excessive-force claims,17 so insurers, not municipalities, typically bear
the financial risk of police violence. For reasons that I (and others) have
explained,18 this financial arrangement gives insurers the incentive to
reduce the frequency of these claims. Indeed, when a prominent risk
management expert compiled a list of twelve “high risk/critical tasks”
in policing that warrant the attention of insurers and risk managers,
use of force topped the list.19
In Section A below, I describe the regulatory techniques insurers
use to manage the risk of excessive force. In Section B, I discuss the
interaction between regulation-by-insurance and more traditional
modes of public regulation.
A.

How Insurers Regulate the Use of Force

As I detail in other work, insurers use a variety of tools to try to
tame police violence, including operational policy development and
education, training, auditing, and risk-responsive underwriting and
rating. Insurers invest substantially, for example, in improving covered
agencies’ policies on the use of force. At the outset of the insurance
relationship, the insurer typically requests copies of the agency’s
Myriam E. Gilles, In Defense of Making Government Pay: The Deterrent Effect of Constitutional
Tort Remedies, 35 GA. L. REV. 845 (2001).
15
Leong, supra note 13, at 446; see also Rachel Harmon, When Is Police Violence Justified?,
102 NW. U. L. REV. 1119, 1127 (2008) (calling the doctrine “indeterminate” as well as
“unprincipled”).
16
Leong, supra note 13, at 447.
17
See, e.g., Law Enforcement Liability Coverage Form, Nat’l Cas. Co. 5–6,
http: //euclidps.com/2/wp-content /uploads/2014/05/Law_Enforcement_II_PE_PL_2_0802.pdf
[https: //perma.cc /E538-LB3C]; see also Kenneth S. Abraham, Four Conceptions of Insurance, 161
U. PENN. L. REV. 653, 656 (2013) (stating that “virtually all property-casualty insurance
policies . . . are standard-forms used by most insurers”).
18
See Rappaport, supra note 2 (manuscript at 16–17); see also Omri Ben-Shahar & Kyle D.
Logue, Outsourcing Regulation: How Insurance Reduces Moral Hazard, 111 MICH. L. REV. 197,
203–05 (2012).
19
G. PATRICK GALLAGHER, SUCCESSFUL POLICE RISK MANAGEMENT 53 (2014); see also
ROBERT J. GIROD, POLICE LIABILITY AND RISK MANAGEMENT 163 (2014) (placing “[u]se of force and
deadly force” atop a list of the “most common ‘actionable conduct’ involving civil rights liability” for
police).
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policies.20 The insurer, sometimes contracting with outside attorneys or
expert consultants, then works with the agency to ensure the policy
incorporates industry best practices.21 In particular, insurers encourage
agencies to adopt a “use of force continuum” that specifies the degree of
force appropriate in various scenarios, and to focus on de-escalating
tense citizen encounters.22 At least some empirical evidence suggests
that these policies matter—that a good use-of-force policy helps reduce
the use of excessive force.23 Throughout the insurance relationship,
insurers also disseminate written materials and videos designed to
educate officers (and agency leadership) about the appropriate use of
force, and some even engage in classroom instruction.24 Many insurers
also provide financial incentives for agencies to seek accreditation from
a recognized authority, such as the Commission on Accreditation of

20

See, e.g., Police Professional Liability Insurance Application, Prof ’l Gov’tal Underwriters,
Inc.
(June
2014),
http: //www.pgui.com/App_Content /media/2014%20apps/DRWN%20PPL
%201010%2006_14%20PGU%20Police%20New%20Bus%20Application.
pdf [https: //perma.cc /XLA2-36Z3].
21
See, e.g., Trident Risk Points: Operational Policies & Procedures: Use of Force Policy
Elements, Trident Ins. Servs. (July 2012), https: //www.argolimited.com/media/03C10U7X865H/
docs/en_US/9a5e44de9e07465726bcb14894240b67ba9c4565/5PLYTFCP9D5H/Trident-LEL-Use-ofForce-Policy-Elements-2012.pdf [https: //perma.cc /2VCJ-QJAW]; see also Brandon L. Garrett,
Innocence, Harmless Error, and Federal Wrongful Conviction Law, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 35, 107
(explaining that municipal liability “can be premised on a police department’s deviation from
national police practices”).
22
See Focus On: Police—Excessive Use of Force, Munich Re (May 2015),
https: //www.munichre.com/site/mram-mobile/get /documents_E876514504/mram/asset
pool.mr_america/PDFs/3_Publications/Research_Spotlight /FOCUS%20ON_Excess-Force.pdf
[https: //perma.cc /4LW9-T4S6]; Trident Risk Points: Operational Policies & Procedures: Suggested
Controls for Electronic Stun Weapons, Trident Ins. Servs. (July 2012), https: //www.argo
limited.com/media/03C10U7X865H/docs/en_US/dad1345ec51a64376baf01f33f257328aa66bfd5/G5
V9I05T5956/Trident-LEL-Electronic-Stun-Weapon-Policy-2012.pdf
[https: //perma.cc /SA9W-DU
3M]; Trident Ins. Servs., supra note 21; see also The Use-of-Force Continuum, NAT’L INST. OF
JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS (Aug. 4, 2009), http: //www.nij.gov/topics/lawenforcement /officer-safety/use-of-force/Pages/continuum.aspx [perma.cc /L2M3-S8LK]. A recent
report by the Police Executive Research Forum challenges the continuum’s status as a “best
practice,” arguing that the continuum can encourage officers to escalate encounters and that
“there are more effective ways to respond to many threats than through a use-of-force continuum.”
POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM, GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON USE OF FORCE 19–20 (2016).
23
See, e.g., Stephen A. Bishopp et al., An Examination of the Effect of a Policy Change on
Police Use of TASERs, 26 CRIM. J. POL’Y REV. 727 (2015) (electronic stun weapons); James J. Fyfe,
Police Use of Deadly Force: Research and Reform, 5 JUST. Q. 165 (1988) (firearms).
24
See, e.g., Munich Re, supra note 22; Law Enforcement Training Videos, IND. MUN. INS.
PROGRAM, http: //www.indianamip.com/law_enforcement.html [https: //perma.cc /5JKX-XUEG] (last
visited Aug. 31, 2015) (listing dozens of training videos covering topics such as “Straight Baton
Techniques,” “Line Officer Tactical Shotgun,” and “Basic and Power Handcuffing Techniques”);
Telephone Interview with Consultant A (Aug. 16, 2014) (describing having conducted, on behalf of
insurers, “hands-on” training on use of force, transportation of prisoners, and other related topics).
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Law Enforcement Agencies.25 Accreditation requires, among other
things, continuous compliance with a thirteen-part set of standards on
the use of force.26
Importantly, insurers’ efforts extend well beyond the Fourth
Amendment’s ambit into an array of extra-legal considerations that
likely affect the frequency and severity of use-of-force events. Consider
four brief examples. First, insurers educate officers on managing the
significant stresses of the job.27 Officers who handle stress poorly, the
evidence suggests, are more likely to act out.28 Second, insurers
encourage psychological testing of each job applicant “to ensure that
the applicant is free of mental illness or other defect that would render
him or her incapable of self-control or appropriate behavior in positions

25

Risk Management, Liability Insurance, and CALEA Accreditation, CALEA,
http: //www.calea.org /content /risk-management-liability-insurance-and-calea-accreditation
[https: //perma.cc /UW7A-3VRU] (last visited Aug. 31, 2015) (maintaining list of “liability insurance
providers known to CALEA to offer some type of financial incentive to CALEA accredited
agencies”); Ileana Garcia, Slidell Police Accreditation Keeps the Department’s Insurance Rate Low,
SLIDELL SENTRY-NEWS, reprinted in CALEA UPDATE MAG., Feb. 2001, http: //www.calea.org /caleaupdate-magazine/issue-75/accreditation-works/slidell-police-accreditation-keeps-departments-in
[https: //perma.cc /H43T-YXMS].
26
See
Standards
Titles,
CALEA,
http: //www.calea.org /content /standards-titles
[perma.cc /D2VM-9ZT8] (last visited Nov. 30, 2015) (listing standards); Law Enforcement Program:
The Standards, CALEA, http: //www.calea.org /content /law-enforcement-program-standards
[http://perma.cc /JR8C-3JZM] (last visited Nov. 30, 2015) (requiring compliance with standards);
Law Enforcement Program: Process, CALEA, http: //www.calea.org /content /law-enforcementprogram-process [http://perma.cc /QJ84-ARP5] (last visited Nov. 30, 2015) (requiring continued
compliance and reaccreditation).
27
E.g., Telephone Interview with Risk Pool D (July 6, 2015).
28
See, e.g., DANIEL CRUSE & JESSE RUBIN, DETERMINANTS OF POLICE BEHAVIOR 5 (1973)
(reporting, based on field study, that “the amount of stress seems to have a good deal of effect on
the behavior of the officer”); GAIL A. GOOLKASIAN ET AL., COPING WITH POLICE STRESS 10 (1986)
(reporting findings that stress can negatively affect work performance, though noting studies’
limitations); Ronald J. Burke & Aslaug Mikkelsen, Burnout, Job Stress and Attitudes Towards the
Use of Force by Norwegian Police Officers, 28 POLICING INT’L J. POLICE STRATS. & MGMT. 269, 269–
72 (2005) (summarizing studies finding that chronic work stress causes burnout, which is
positively and significantly related to the use of force); Nicolien Kop & Martin C. Euwema,
Occupational Stress and the Use of Force by Dutch Police Officers, 28 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 631
(2001) (similar); Manny Fernandez, Officer Was Under Stress When He Arrived at Texas Pool
Party, Lawyer Says, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2015, at A15 (describing lawyer’s assertion that
McKinney, Texas, police officer who was videotaped tackling a black teenager in a bikini outside a
pool party was under stress after responding to two earlier calls involving a suicide and attempted
suicide); Mark Bond, The Impact of Stress and Fatigue on Law Enforcement Officers and Steps to
Control It, IN PUBLIC SAFETY (Feb. 24, 2014), http: //inpublicsafety.com/2014/02/the-impact-ofstress-and-fatigue-on-law-enforcement-officers-and-steps-to-control-it
[https://perma.cc/L8ZSVBLN] (asserting that officer stress can lead to fatigue, which in turn can lead to misconduct and
“inappropriate reactions to a situation”).
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of authority and/or responsibility.”29 Third, insurers increasingly tout
the harm-reducing potential of body-worn cameras. At a recent
conference for the Association of Governmental Risk Pools, for example,
one speaker, addressing a group of municipal insurers, discussed
studies finding that body-worn cameras had reduced both the use of
force and citizen complaints about the use of force.30 And fourth,
insurers have begun efforts to reduce the risk of harm from police
departments’ use of military equipment. Although I have not seen
insurers purport to forbid agencies from employing military equipment,
“police departments with access to military equipment,” one insurance
newsletter admonishes, must take care to have “appropriate training
and deployment standards in place.”31
Insurers also help police departments train their officers by
supplying materials, funding training programs, or even purchasing
costly training equipment. Especially relevant here, some insurers
subsidize expensive “virtual reality” training on use-of-force

29

See, e.g., Trident Risk Points: Operational Policies & Procedures: Law Enforcement
Employment Hiring Policy, Trident Ins. Servs. (Sept. 2012), https: //www.argolimited.com/
media/03C10U7X865H/docs/en_US/74ab995451582b436242abc67f5252a8f9e34329/795717IY6X5I/
Trident-Employment-Hiring-Program-2012.pdf [https: //perma.cc /2P9J-PQAM]. The research on
the benefits of psychological screening of officer candidates is mixed. See, e.g., Michael G. Aamodt,
Predicting Law Enforcement Officer Performance with Personality Inventories, in PERSONALITY
ASSESSMENT IN POLICE PSYCHOLOGY 229, 238–40 (Peter A. Weiss ed., 2010) (reporting, based on
meta-analysis of 200 studies, that some aspects of certain personality tests do a reasonable job of
predicting officer performance, including disciplinary problems, but many do not); Robert E.
Cochrane et al., Psychological Testing and the Selection of Police Officers: A National Survey, 30
CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 511, 515 (2003) (collecting sources that have “demonstrated the usefulness
of personality measures in predicting job performance” of police officers); Candice Bernd,
Evaluating Police Psychology: Who Passes the Test?, TRUTHOUT (Feb. 20, 2015, 9:25 AM),
http: //www.truth-out.org /news/item/29191-evaluating-police-psychology-who-passes-the-test
[http://perma.cc /YXM7-TFD6] (asserting that, “[w]hen departments forgo psychological screenings,
the result is often violence,” but also highlighting the lack of standardization and sophistication of
screening exams).
30
Ken Wallentine, Vice President & Senior Legal Advisor, Lexipol, Body Worn Cameras: Risk
and Reward (Oct. 6, 2015). Wallentine cited studies from Rialto, California, and Denver, Colorado.
See Barak Ariel et al., The Effect of Police Body-Worn Cameras on Use of Force and Citizens’
Complaints Against the Police: A Randomized Controlled Trial, 31 J. QUANT. CRIMINOLOGY 509
(2015); Cole Zercoe, Body Camera Study: Denver Police See Drop in Arrests, UOF Complaints,
POLICEONE (Sept. 4, 2015), http: //www.policeone.com/police-products/body-cameras/articles/
9485301-Body-camera-study-Denver-police-see-drop-in-arrests-UOF-complaints/
[https: //perma.
cc /ZD3X-QETH]; see also Munich Re, supra note 22 (“[P]olice departments are encouraged to
purchase body cameras, provide training and set standards for their use.”); The Effect of Body
Worn Cameras & Police Use of Force, Trident Ins. Servs. (Feb. 2015), https: //www.
argolimited.com/media/03C10U7X865H/docs/en_US/d94acf91189467168892daca4ba90de76bc8a26
3/D6L33YO488Y0/Your_Risk_Control_Resource_-_Feb15.pdf
[https: //perma.cc /33HQ-LVYG]
(“[B]ody-worn cameras appear to be a potentially valuable tool in reducing police use of force and
related incidents.”).
31
Munich Re, supra note 22.
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simulators.32 These “[m]odern computerized use of force simulators
expose police officers to highly realistic and interactive scenarios
whereby they can learn appropriate responses using the full range of
use of force options available.”33 Rather than simply honing
marksmanship, these tools teach officers to apply their skills
appropriately under “field-compatible” conditions.34 In empirical
research, such “simulation training has been demonstrated to increase
the number of preventative actions taken by police officers, enhance
shooting accuracy, reduce the number of shots fired to achieve an
objective, increase the degree to which police officers use cover, and
decrease the number of unjustified shootings.”35
Insurers also facilitate training about how not to use force. Another
presentation at the Association of Governmental Risk Pools conference
focused on using mediation and alternative dispute resolution
techniques on the policing beat.36 Many insurers offer courses on verbal
de-escalation techniques, subsidized for policyholders.37 And in a
newsletter recommending measures to reduce the use of force, one
insurer advises that “a comprehensive training program should be
conducted by outside personnel and focus on defusing incidents.”38
One ubiquitous challenge in policing the police is ensuring
continued compliance with departmental policies. Adopting good
policies and procedures, that is, and training on those policies when
officers join the force, may get a department off to the right start, but

32

See, e.g., Law Enforcement Training Solutions, MEGGITT TRAINING SYS.,
http: //meggitttrainingsystems.com/Law-Enforcement [https: //perma.cc /2M6B-4F76] (last visited
Aug. 31, 2015); VIRTRA, http: //www.virtra.com/ [https: //perma.cc /3DKA-Q4ZK] (last visited Aug.
31, 2015); MILO RANGE, http: //www.milorange.com [https: //perma.cc /UQ35-KHNN] (last visited
Aug. 31, 2015).
33
CRAIG BENNELL & NATALIE J. JONES, CAN. POLICE RESEARCH CTR., THE EFFECTIVENESS OF
USE OF FORCE SIMULATION TRAINING 8 (2005), http: //www.publicsafety.gc.ca/lbrr/archives/cnmcsplcng /cn000032136920-eng.pdf [https: //perma.cc /P35H-NGY6].
34
Id.
35
Id. at 6; see also Jennifer Armstrong et al., Monitoring the Impact of Scenario-Based Useof-Force Simulations on Police Heart Rate: Evaluating the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Skills
Refresher Program, 15 W. CRIMINOLOGY REV. 51 (2014); Evelyn-Rose Saus et al., The Effect of
Brief Situational Awareness Training in a Police Shooting Simulator: An Experimental Study, 18
MILITARY PSYCH. S3 (2006).
36
William Micklus, Assoc. Dir., Upper Midwest Cmty. Policing Inst. & Jeffrey Range, Senior
Practitioner, Resologics, Dispute Resolution: Skills Training for Law Enforcement (Oct. 7, 2015).
37
See, e.g., Training Calendar, WASH. CITIES INS. AUTH., http: //www.wciapool.org /educationtraining /calendar [https: //perma.cc /6QWJ-F4NE] (last visited Nov. 30, 2015); Featured Training
Notice, CITIES & VILLS. MUT. INS. CO. (Mar. 26, 2015), http: //www.cvmic.com/featured-trainingnotice/ [https: //perma.cc /DQ6E-NEJP].
38
Munich Re, supra note 22.
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proper maintenance is essential.39 Accredited agencies must
demonstrate their continued compliance with accreditation standards,
though the extent of those obligations is unclear.40 Insurers address the
compliance problem by auditing agencies on a regular basis—anywhere
from semi-annually to once every three years, according to the experts I
interviewed.41 Insurers send auditors or consultants to visit insured
agencies, sometimes for two- or three-day stints. The auditors review
police reports, internal affairs files, and other liability-related
documentation.42 They may go out in the field with the chief or other
officers.43 Insurers also use data on claims involving the use of force to
identify troubled agencies and problem officers.44 Agencies that make
an insurer’s “watch list” are audited more frequently and intensely.
These auditing practices seem to capture at least the spirit of the “early
warning systems” many policing experts have praised.45
None of what I’ve said so far, importantly, addresses whether
municipalities listen to their insurers—whether they actually do what
insurers say they ought to do. The answer, generally speaking, seems to

39

See, e.g., Barbara E. Armacost, Organizational Culture and Police Misconduct, 72 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 453 (2004) (discussing the separation between formal departmental policies and
informal de facto norms); Samuel Walker, The New Paradigm of Police Accountability: The U.S.
Justice Department “Pattern or Practice” Suits in Context, 22 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 3, 45
(2003) (disaggregating “primary compliance,” which “involves the development of a formal policy
on a particular aspect of police operations”; “secondary compliance,” which “involves evidence that
the department has incorporated the policy into training and supervision”; and “operational
compliance,” which “involves evidence that officers comply with the policy in their routine
activities”).
40
See supra note 24.
41
Telephone Interview with Commercial Insurer A (July 20, 2015) (every three years);
Telephone Interview with Risk Pool A (Sept. 2, 2014) (annual); Telephone Interview with Risk
Pool B (Sept. 2, 2014) (semi-annual). Some insurers require online updates from agencies in
between audits or encourage self-audits in addition. Telephone Interview with Risk Pool B, supra
(requires periodic online updates); Trident Risk Points: Operational Policies & Procedures:
Monitoring Compliance with Law Enforcement Manual, Trident Ins. Servs. (July 2012),
https: //www.argolimited.com/media/03C10U7X865H/docs/en_US/1ff185e22af3a5c38781aa76ee68fc
ccad4ee5e6/IQJ40V3Z1A83/Trident-LEL-Compliance_with-Manual-2012.pdf
[https: //perma.cc /G5FS-XPR8] (providing guidelines for self-audits).
42
Telephone Interview with Risk Pool A, supra note 41; Telephone Interview with Consultant
B (Aug. 27, 2014).
43
Telephone Interview with Risk Pool A, supra note 41; Telephone Interview with Risk Pool
C (June 29, 2015).
44
Telephone Interview with Commercial Insurer A, supra note 41; Telephone Interview with
Commercial Insurer D (Oct. 13, 2015); Telephone Interview with Risk Pool A, supra note 41;
Telephone Interview with Risk Pool D, supra note 27; Telephone Interview with Consultant A,
supra note 24; Telephone Interview with Consultant C (Aug. 20, 2014).
45
See, e.g., SAMUEL WALKER & CAROL A. ARCHBOLD, THE NEW WORLD OF POLICE
ACCOUNTABILITY 137–77 (2d ed. 2014); Armacost, supra note 39, at 459–60; SAMUEL WALKER ET
AL., RESPONDING TO THE PROBLEM OFFICER: A NATIONAL STUDY OF EARLY WARNING SYSTEMS 2.4–
2.6 (2000), https: //www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/184510.pdf [https: //perma.cc /EXE6-X4TN].
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be yes.46 Insurers have two principal ways to induce agencies to
cooperate with loss-prevention initiatives: they can raise rates and
threaten to terminate coverage. Insurers charge more to agencies that
frequently tender claims, just like your auto insurer does to you; and
they lower prices for agencies that demonstrate commitment to loss
prevention, such as by obtaining accreditation. Some also adjust rates
based on the existence and quality of various departmental policies.
And when rate adjustments are not enough to make municipalities
listen, insurers can terminate coverage, or credibly threaten to do so. At
least partly in response to these incentives, police agencies adopt or
amend departmental policies on important subjects like the use of force
and firearms. They change the way they train their officers. And they
even fire problem officers, all the way up to the chief.47 In extreme
cases, municipalities have shuttered police departments after their
insurers pulled coverage.48
According to one expert with several decades of experience in the
industry, municipal liability insurers are more heavily focused on
policing now than at any time since the early 1990s. The Rodney King
beating in 1991, this expert said, had “ripple effects” throughout the
industry. Insurers sought to ensure that police agencies had adequate
policies and procedures on the use of force and related subjects. After a
while, though, attention waned as other sources of municipal liability
captured insurers’ interest. Now, after the recent wave of highly
publicized officer-involved deaths, insurers find themselves “back in the
soup.” Many insurers, moreover, now recognize that the problems with

46

For far more detail on this topic, see Rappaport, supra note 2 (manuscript at 50–55,

57–59).
47

See, e.g., Alex Green, Niota Officials Tied to Beating Fired; They Say Insurance Company
Forced the Action, TIMES FREE PRESS (Chattanooga), Aug. 24, 2013 (quoting mayor’s report that
city’s coverage would have been dropped if two officers involved in misconduct had been allowed
back on duty); Rutledge Mayor “Had No Choice” in Firing: Police Chief Refused to Resign; City at
Risk of Losing Insurance, KNOXVILLE NEWS-SENTINEL, Mar. 23, 2010 (reporting mayor’s assertion
he “‘had no choice’” but to fire a police chief accused of misconduct because “the city was at risk of
losing its liability insurance” if the chief remained (quoting Mayor Danny Turley)); see also Rob
Karwath, Calumet City Will Lose Police Liability Insurance, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 29, 1988 (reporting
council member’s comment that city’s insurance cancellation was “the final argument for the
mayor to pick a new police chief from outside the department” when the interim chief retired).
48
See, e.g., Schwartz, How Governments Pay, supra note 2, at 1190–91 & nn.165–71
(collecting four examples of police departments that closed due to premium increases or
termination of coverage); see also George J. Church, Sorry, Your Policy Is Canceled, TIME, Mar. 24,
1986, at 16, 17, 18 (reporting that police patrols were suspended in two towns and five counties
closed their jails due to lack of coverage); Tyler Jett, City of Niota, Tenn., Shutting Down. Again.,
TIMES FREE PRESS (Chattanooga), June 19, 2013 (reporting that the city’s “police department is
closed” after its insurer pulled coverage); cf. Liability Insurance in Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4,
1986, at A26 (reporting that “police in West Orange, N.J., had to stop patrolling in cars they could
no longer insure”).
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police go “beyond policies and procedures”; in order to reduce
misconduct, insurers—and we, as a society—“need to find the root
cause.”49
B.

Private Regulation, Public Regulation

Meanwhile, politicians, too, have considered how to respond to
recent police violence. According to the National Conference of State
Legislatures, in the year 2015 alone, twenty-four state legislatures
considered bills to address investigatory procedures for officer-involved
deaths.50 Measures in thirteen of those states concern the appointment
of special prosecutors. Seven states are evaluating bills about the
collection of data and tracking of statistics in officer-involved deaths.
Other related bills deal with chokeholds, body-worn cameras, the
public’s ability to film law enforcement, and military equipment.
These are positive developments that I do not wish to disparage in
any way. They may be crucial for regulating self-insured departments
that do not take loss prevention seriously, which likely describes many
major metropolitan agencies, including some that are (rightly) under
the microscope today. And they may serve retributive and expressive
purposes necessary to rebuild community trust in the police. Yet, from
a regulatory (i.e., deterrence) perspective, I am skeptical about their
capacity to improve meaningfully upon what insurers are already
doing.51 In fact, insurers’ private regulation may well be more nuanced,
nimble, and data-driven than what state legislatures can accomplish.52
To the extent that legislative resources (or the political support
necessary to marshal those resources) are scarce, one can make a case

49

Telephone Interview with Commercial Insurer B (July 24, 2015); see also Telephone
Interview with Commercial Broker A (July 22, 2015) (agreeing that underwriters have become
more concerned with police liability since Ferguson); Roberto Ceniceros, Scandals Can Influence
Police Liability Coverage, BUS. INS. (June 5, 2000), http: //www.businessinsurance.com/article/
20000604/ISSUE01/10002637/scandals-can-influence-police-liability-coverage
[https: //perma.cc /
26HY-XAF5] (discussing effect of police scandals on rates and coverage nationwide); Zusha
Elinson & Dan Frosch, Cost of Police-Misconduct Cases Soars in Big U.S. Cities; Data Show Rising
Payouts for Police-Misconduct Settlements and Court Judgments, WALL ST. J., July 15, 2015
(“[I]nsurers and lawyers who defend police say current scrutiny of law enforcement is broadly
affecting the resolution of lawsuits.”).
50
Law Enforcement Overview, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (May 29, 2015),
http: //www.ncsl.org /research/civil-and-criminal-justice/law-enforcement.aspx
[https: //perma.cc /EP3X-EKD5].
51
The prospect of criminal punishment may discourage some egregious misconduct, but I am
inclined to agree with Paul Chevigny that “[c]riminal law is . . . not a system of ‘discipline’ for
police misconduct; it defines the outer limits of what is permissible in society” and is at best a
“patchy deterrent.” See PAUL CHEVIGNY, EDGE OF THE KNIFE 98–101 (1995).
52
See generally Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 18.
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that they should be spent where the private regulatory system is
absent or fails to function, rather than where it seems to function best.
Instead, we might devote public efforts to supporting the
regulatory function insurers provide. We could consider, for example,
mandating market insurance for municipalities that cannot
demonstrate a good-faith commitment to loss prevention. We might
also examine whether there are legal threats that cause insurers to shy
away from more intensive regulation. Although, as I mentioned above,
some insurers have successfully pressured agencies to terminate
problem officers, others I interviewed expressed fear that doing so
might subject them to liability, or at least to legal action, under
employment, labor, or contract law.53 If this fear is well founded, it may
be worth creating narrow safe harbors from liability for insurers to
remove a disincentive to socially beneficial risk regulation.54
III. HIGH-DOLLAR, LONG-TAIL
An individual who is wrongfully convicted, incarcerated, and later
exonerated and freed can generally sue for damages for the time spent
unjustly imprisoned.55 Successful plaintiffs—by one estimate, twentyeight percent of all those exonerated by DNA who sue56—have in some
cases obtained judgments and settlements upwards of one million
dollars for each year of incarceration.57 Multiply that by the thirteen
years the average exoneree spends in prison,58 and it’s not hard to see
53

See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Risk Pool D, supra note 27.
Cf. Kyle D. Logue, Encouraging Insurers to Regulate: The Role (If Any) for Tort Law, 5 U.C.
IRVINE L. REV. 1355 (2015).
55
“Generally” is a meaningful modifier here. See Garrett, supra note 21, at 54; see generally
Michael Avery, Obstacles to Litigating Civil Claims for Wrongful Conviction: An Overview, 18 B.U.
PUB. INT. L.J. 439 (2009).
56
See INNOCENCE PROJECT, MAKING UP FOR LOST TIME: WHAT THE WRONGFULLY CONVICTED
ENDURE AND HOW TO PROVIDE FAIR COMPENSATION 4, http: //www.innocenceproject.org /files/
imported/innocence_project_compensation_report-6.pdf [https: //perma.cc /CS7U-MJMW].
57
Garrett, supra note 21, at 43 n.30, 44 n.32 (collecting cases); see also Mark Iris, Your Tax
Dollars at Work! Chicago Police Lawsuit Payments: How Much, and for What?, 2 VA. J. CRIM. L.
25, 44–45 (2014) (reporting average payouts of $2.4 and 3.2 million per case for Chicago police
defendants in wrongful conviction cases between 2006 and 2012 in federal and state courts,
respectively). Compensation is all over the map, however, and in some cases is grievously lacking.
Compare Martin G. Hacala, Insights: Wrongful Convictions: What Governmental Risk Pools, and
the Public Entities They Insure, Need to Know, GENESIS, at 5 (May 2012), https: //www.genesis
insurance.com/assets/pdfs/In%20the%20News/Insights20125-2.pdf [https: //perma.cc /P9KB-GNT4]
(“[D]amages awarded in wrongful conviction claims vary significantly. Indeed, it isn’t unheard of
for the wrongfully convicted to recover nothing or a trivial amount.”), with id. at 6 (collecting cases
sustaining damages in the millions).
58
Hacala, supra note 57, at 3. A prisoner may not sue for wrongful conviction until his
conviction is reversed, expunged, or otherwise invalidated. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477
(1994).
54
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how enormous the liability risk can be. Police misconduct, my focus
here, contributes to many, though not all, of these wrongful
convictions.59 The leading police-related causes of wrongful conviction
include erroneous eyewitness identification, faulty forensic evidence,
false informant testimony, and false or coerced confessions.60 Where
police are implicated, police liability policies generally cover the
claims.61
One might think, therefore, that insurers would be highly attuned
to the risk of wrongful convictions and, as with the use of force, would
closely regulate the agencies they insure in an effort to reduce that
risk. But the long tail of most wrongful conviction claims—the delay
between when the wrongful conduct occurred and when the claim is
filed—makes the claims an insurance nightmare.62 Section A briefly
explains why. Section B discusses potential responses to the difficulties
insurers face.
A.

The Challenges of Insuring Long-Tail Risks

Insurance theory suggests several reasons that long-tail risks may
strain insurers’ regulatory capabilities. The problem worsens when, as
here, the risks are also low in probability but highly consequential.
Sections 1 and 2 address these respective points. Section 3 reports
qualitative empirical findings that tend to substantiate the challenges
theory predicts.
1. The basic theory.
A long tail of liability creates at least three distinct problems for
insurers. First, the long tail heightens the degree of correlation (i.e.,
statistical dependence) among the covered risks. All liability insurance,
59

See Garrett, supra note 21, at 42 (“[I]n a surprisingly large number of cases, wrongful
convictions were caused by police misconduct.”); see generally Russell Covey, Police Misconduct as
a Cause of Wrongful Convictions, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 1133 (2013). According to a 1999 study, the
figure is fifty percent. JIM DWYER ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE 246 (2003). Other common causes of
wrongful convictions include prosecutorial misconduct and deficient defense counsel. See, e.g.,
JAMES R. ACKER & ALLISON D. REDLICH, WRONGFUL CONVICTION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICY
(2011); JON B. GOULD ET AL., PREDICTING ERRONEOUS CONVICTIONS: A SOCIAL SCIENCE APPROACH
TO MISCARRIAGES OF JUSTICE (2012).
60
Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 75–91 (2008); see generally
BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT (2011).
61
See, e.g., Nat’l Cas. Co., supra note 17, at 5–6 (covering “[f]alse arrest, detention or
imprisonment, or malicious prosecution” and “[v]iolation of civil rights protected under 42 USC
1981 et sequential or State Law”); Telephone Interview No. 2 with Risk Pool A (Oct. 5, 2015);
Telephone Interview No. 2 with Risk Pool B (Oct. 5, 2015).
62
See Hacala, supra note 57, at 2 (“[E]xoneration . . . presents a significant legal and
financial challenge for public entities and the [entities] that insure them.”).
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at least in theory, involves problems of correlated risk “if the rules
under which liability is determined and damages are assessed change
over the life of the insurance contracts.”63 In many insurance contexts,
the law is unlikely to change much, but the delay entailed by long-tail
risks exposes insurers to “judicial, legislative, and economic changes
that commonly influence the ultimate determination of awards.”64 “For
example, unexpected inflation over the runoff period could commonly
increase the ultimate payoff on all outstanding claims beyond the
amount reserved by the insurer. Similarly, a new judicial precedent or
legislation can expand the area of liability, ease the burden of proof for
future plaintiffs, or cause a common upward shift in the value of
awards on all outstanding claims.”65 Even changes in prevailing
attitudes toward the police and the criminal justice system can have a
substantial (and correlated) effect.66 All this matters because, the more
that risks are correlated, the less insurers can reduce the risks by
aggregating them, which is one of their defining functions.67 This is
why losses from risks that affect many policyholders simultaneously,
like earthquakes, are commonly excluded from homeowners and
renters policies.68
Second, the long tail can create incentives that lead insurers to
regulate too little. “Because of turnover, risk managers may have a
much shorter time horizon than the firm. Current decisionmakers may
reap no reward within the organization for reducing remote risks and
may even be penalized for expending current funds for doing so.”69 As a
result, insurance managers may “externalize to the future,” maximizing
their short-term results at the expense of long-term interests.70 This
“coordination-across-time problem” is another reason that “latent
harms . . . can put insurers in a poor regulatory position.”71

63

Neil A. Doherty & Georges Dionne, Insurance with Undiversifiable Risk: Contract
Structure and Organizational Form of Insurance Firms, 6 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 187, 188 (1993).
64
Id. at 198.
65
Id. For an excellent clarifying discussion that classifies types of “liability developments
risk,” see Tom Baker, Insuring Liability Risks, 29 GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK & INS. 128 (2004).
66
See Ceniceros, supra note 49.
67
See HOWARD C. KUNREUTHER ET AL., INSURANCE AND BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS 83–85
(2013); S. HUN SEOG, THE ECONOMICS OF RISK AND INSURANCE 47 (2010).
68
See Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 18, at 215.
69
Martin T. Katzman, Pollution Liability Insurance and Catastrophic Environmental Risk,
55 J. RISK & INS. 75, 83 (1988).
70
KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK 48 (1986); cf. Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note
18, at 230 (“Some of the risks that insurers regulate materialize into harms far into the future,
which means that insurers’ efforts to reduce such risks will largely benefit future insurers.”).
71
Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 18, at 230.
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Third, and maybe most important, the long tail creates uncertainty
about the number and magnitude of wrongful conviction claims
insurers should expect. Here I mean to reference the distinction
insurance theorists draw between risk and uncertainty. Risk refers to
“a probability that can be estimated, whether on the basis of observed
frequency or of theory.”72 Uncertainty refers to “a probability that
cannot be estimated.”73 Risk, put differently, “is something that you can
put a price on,” whereas uncertainty “is risk that is hard to measure.”74
The long delay between the collection of premiums and the processing
of claims complicates measurement of a long-tail risk. “Even if the
frequency and severity of future claims were predictable in current
dollars, economic and legal inflation over such a long period would
make assessment of ultimate financial exposure extremely
speculative.”75
2. The additional difficulty of low-probability, high-consequence
risks.
It seems, moreover, that the frequency of future wrongful
conviction claims is not particularly amenable to prediction, largely
because it is too low.76 A wrongful conviction claim is what is called a
low-probability, high-consequence event, a phenomenon that
consistently eludes human predictive capacity: “Much of the time,
human beings ignore low-probability, high-consequence events, giving
them far less attention than they deserve. But when people experience
or see a relevant bad outcome, their concern frequently becomes

72

RICHARD A. POSNER, CATASTROPHE 171–72 (2004).
Id. at 172.
74
NATE SILVER, THE SIGNAL AND THE NOISE 29 (2012). The distinction traces back to FRANK
H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT 197–232 (1921); see also CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WORSTCASE SCENARIOS 147 (2007) (describing uncertainty as a situation “where outcomes can be
identified but no probabilities can be assigned” and risk as “where outcomes can be identified and
probabilities assigned to various outcomes”); id. at 159–62 (defending the distinction). But see
MILTON FRIEDMAN, PRICE THEORY 282 (1976) (challenging the distinction’s validity).
75
ABRAHAM, supra note 70, at 47.
76
SAMUEL R. GROSS & MICHAEL SHAFFER, NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, EXONERATIONS
IN THE UNITED STATES, 1989–2012, at 3 (2012), http: //www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/
Documents/exonerations_us_1989_2012_full_report.pdf [https: //perma.cc /97NR-SVK7] (“[E]ven
2,000 exonerations over 23 years is a tiny number in a country with 2.3 million people in prisons
and jails.”). The rate of exonerations does seem to be increasing, however. See, e.g., NAT’L
REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, THE FIRST 1,600 EXONERATIONS 5 (2015), http: //www.law.umich.edu/
special/exoneration/Documents/1600_Exonerations.pdf [https: //perma.cc /AT36-S4WG]; Sam R.
Gross et al., Exonerations in the United States: 1989 through 2003, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
523, 527 (2005). Perhaps this is not surprising, given that the errors that lead to wrongful
convictions are typically systemic, not idiosyncratic. See, e.g., GARRETT, supra note 60, at 274;
Jennifer E. Laurin, Still Convicting the Innocent, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1473, 1475 (2012) (book review).
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exaggerated.”77 This may be why one insurer asserts that “[t]here is no
way for [an insurer] to predict the likelihood or volume of exonerations
and civil claims.”78
All this uncertainty gums up the insurance machine, for insurance
deals far better with risk than uncertainty. Insurers faced with
uncertainty cannot accurately price coverage. “[D]espite high levels of
expertise and strong incentives to make logical decisions, [insurance
managers] make errors with respect to situations where there is
uncertainty or ambiguous information regarding the low probability
risks they face. When insurers have limited data and limited past
experience with extreme events, there is a tendency for them to engage
in intuitive thinking when determining what coverage to offer against
specific risks and how much to charge.”79 For this reason, “[i]t would
not be unusual for a governmental risk pool to have little or no
remaining [incurred but not reported] reserves in the accident year in
which the trigger date falls,” i.e., the year in which a wrongful arrest or
conviction occurred.80 “This means a single significant claim could put
significant pressure on the pool’s surplus.”81
Nor can insurers be confident about what loss-prevention measures
they can reasonably insist upon. As Kenneth Abraham explains, “the
threat of uncertain liability can promote optimal safety levels only by
mere chance, because risk-optimizing behavior requires cost-benefit
calculations that are necessarily impossible in the face of great
77

SUNSTEIN, supra note 74, at 21–24. There is a substantial related literature finding that
individuals purchase too little insurance against low-probability events. See, e.g., Mark J. Browne,
Behavioral Bias and the Demand for Bicycle and Flood Insurance, 50 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 141
(2015); Philip T. Ganderton et al., Buying Insurance for Disaster-Type Risks: Experimental
Evidence, 20 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 271 (2000); Paul Schoemaker & Howard C. Kunreuther, An
Experimental Study of Insurance Decisions, 46 J. RISK & INS. 603 (1979); Paul Slovic et al.,
Preference for Insuring Against Probable Small Losses: Insurance Implications, 44 J. RISK & INS.
237 (1977); see also Gary H. McClelland et al., Insurance for Low-Probability Hazards: A Bimodal
Response to Unlikely Events, 7 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 95 (1993) (finding extreme bimodality in
willingness to pay). But see Susan K. Laury et al., Insurance Decisions for Low-Probability Losses,
39 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 17 (2009).
78
Hacala, supra note 57, at 9.
79
Howard C. Kunreuther & Mark V. Pauly, Behavioral Economics and Insurance: Principles
and Solutions, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF INSURANCE LAW 15, 21–23 (Daniel
Schwarcz & Peter Siegelman eds., 2015); see KUNREUTHER ET AL., supra note 67, at 7
(“Insurers . . . misunderstand how to predict rare events and therefore sometimes make decisions
that appear to ignore risks altogether. Alternatively, they sometimes fixate on the magnitude of
recent losses and claims without weighting these figures by an estimate of the likelihood of
another catastrophe occurring.”); Katzman, supra note 69, at 85. This is not to say there are no
methods to predict extreme events. See, e.g., Robert Lund, Revenge of the White Swan, 61 AM.
STATISTICIAN 189, 190 (2007) (discussing extreme value theory, “the statistician’s bible for
quantifying rare events”).
80
Hacala, supra note 57, at 9.
81
Id.
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uncertainty.”82 And any attempt by insurers to adjust to new
understandings of the scope of liability—through, say, raising
premiums or crafting an exclusion—cannot have impact for years,
when claims stemming from today’s conduct will arise. It can only cut
future losses.83 As for the conduct covered long ago, which may give rise
to a claim tomorrow, insurers cannot but concede the familiar truism,
that “the past is the past.”84
3. The empirics.
My own empirical research, conducted for this Article, largely
confirms what theory predicts. Exploiting contacts made while
conducting a larger, related empirical project, I interviewed eight
insurers—including both commercial firms and intergovernmental risk
pools—about how they price and manage the risk of wrongful
convictions.85 For the most part, they don’t. Some had not even given
the issue any thought.86 The insurers confirmed that wrongful
conviction suits are covered when law enforcement is implicated,
absent some particular exclusion. But none of them attempts to
determine the share of the premium attributable to wrongful conviction
coverage. Nor, for the most part, do they engage in any loss prevention
specifically designed to reduce the incidence of wrongful convictions.
These insurers seemed simply to ignore the risk.87

82

Abraham, supra note 4, at 944; see also ABRAHAM, supra note 70, at 51 (“[T]he capacity of
any system of liability to promote optimal deterrence depends on how predictable liability is.”).
Compare Richard Lempert, Low Probability/High Consequence Events: Dilemmas of Damage
Compensation, 58 DEPAUL L. REV. 357, 385 (2009) (listing reasons, including “psychological
denial,” that “make it almost inevitable that insufficient precaution will be taken” against lowprobability, high-consequence events), and Katzman, supra note 69, at 83 (“Given a ‘finite
reservoir of concern,’ risk managers may pay little attention to low-probability risks, no matter
how severe the potential consequences.”), with Eric A. Posner, Probability Errors: Some Positive
and Normative Implications for Tort and Contract Law, 11 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 125, 126 (2004)
(showing that a “person who discounts remote risks might take too much care, rather than too
little”).
83
ABRAHAM, supra note 70, at 965.
84
Telephone Interview with Commercial Insurer C (Oct. 26, 2015). I do not mean to suggest
there is nothing insurers can do to improve their position vis-à-vis claims arising from actions
taken years ago. Some insurers have gone back to shore up their reserves for past coverage years.
Id. But this does not reduce the likelihood that harm from past actions will manifest.
85
For more on methodology, see supra note 5.
86
See, e.g., Telephone Interview No. 2 with Risk Pool A, supra note 61 (explaining that the
pool had never priced the risk or looked at specific loss-prevention measures because it had never
considered the risk, which it believed more relevant in big cities and in the South).
87
Id.; Telephone Interview No. 2 with Commercial Insurer B (Oct. 1, 2015) (speculating that
wrongful convictions are not a significant issue for pools his company reinsures because the pools’
members are “puny munis”). But see Telephone Interview with Commercial Insurer D, supra note
44 (reinsures small pools that have encountered wrongful conviction claims).
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A few insurers emphasized that, although they take no steps to
address wrongful conviction risks in particular, their general
underwriting and loss-prevention practices should sufficiently control
the exposure. One stressed the importance of accreditation by agencies
that impose continuing education standards and check for wellmaintained policies and procedures.88 Another said his pool educates
the police about their obligation to disclose exculpatory evidence and
audits agencies’ evidence rooms for conformance with best practices.89
That pool also scrutinizes the integrity of agency personnel, reviewing
the veracity of employment applications and performance during
probationary employment periods.90 The same expert added that
underwriters will notice a department that’s generally sloppy, based on
responses to questionnaires about best practices.91 But, he added,
tellingly, as for how such measures actually affect (and reflect) the risk
of wrongful conviction, “There’s no science behind it.”92
My research therefore suggests that, to the extent insurers attempt
to price the risk of wrongful convictions, their efforts are crude, at best.
This means that, in this context—in contrast to what I said in Part II
about the use of force—insurers may be making matters worse rather
than better. “Failure to risk-rate premiums,” it is well known, can
“create[ ] moral hazard.”93 Depressed prices, assuming that’s what we
have, weaken incentives for loss prevention and send inaccurate signals
to both insured municipalities and the public about the risk and cost of
wrongful convictions.94

88

Telephone Interview with Commercial Insurer D, supra note 44.
Telephone Interview No. 2 with Risk Pool C (Sept. 28, 2015); see also Telephone Interview
with Risk Pool E (Oct. 7, 2015) (reporting that wrongful convictions are “just coming onto the
radar,” and that an industry conference, last year for the first time, included a session on wrongful
convictions, focusing on the duty to disclose exculpatory evidence).
90
Telephone Interview No. 2 with Risk Pool C, supra note 89; see also Telephone Interview
No. 2 with Risk Pool A, supra note 61 (stressing “integrity first in personal and professional
behavior”).
91
Telephone Interview No. 2 with Risk Pool C, supra note 89.
92
Id. This expert’s admission calls to mind the terrorism context, in which insurers have
been similarly unable to gauge risk levels accurately. See Michelle E. Boardman, Known
Unknowns: The Illusion of Terrorism Insurance, 93 GEO. L.J. 783, 815–20 (2005) (arguing that
terrorism risk is incalculable largely because the data are too scarce and disparate; that insurers
are “guessing” on prices, which vary wildly; and that pricing has “not been very scientific” because
“underwriters are relying on their experience and instincts”).
93
Kunreuther & Pauly, supra note 79, at 24.
94
See Boardman, supra note 92, at 836–42 (discussing the efficiency costs of inaccurate
pricing, which sends inaccurate signals about the risk and cost of harm). In theory, insurers could
be (unwittingly) charging too much, rather than too little, to cover the risk of wrongful convictions,
leading insured municipalities to overinvest in loss prevention. I think this is unlikely, however,
and I heard no hint of it during any of my conversations with industry experts.
89
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What is more, if experience in analogous domains is any guide,
insurers’ ostrich-like approach to covering wrongful conviction claims
may mask fragility and volatility in this corner of the market, which a
run of wrongful convictions may lay bare. “After a severe loss, insurers
may withdraw from covering this risk because they focus on the losses
from a worst-case scenario without adequately reflecting on the [low]
likelihood of this event occurring in the future.”95 This is what
happened with coverage against terrorism risks. “[P]rior to 9/11,
insurance losses from terrorism were viewed as so improbable that the
risk was not explicitly mentioned or priced in any standard policy.”96
But “[f]ollowing the 9/11 attacks, most insurance swung to the other
extreme.”97 The same thing occurred with pollution insurance.98 The
few insurers I spoke to who do have an eye on the issue agreed that
wrongful conviction coverage could meet a similar fate, especially if the
present “soft” market firms up.99
B.

Responding to Insurance Shortfalls

If what I have said is correct, a two-headed reform agenda is in
order. First, we should seek ways to shore up the insurance function,
both to improve insurers’ capacity to regulate the risk of wrongful
convictions and to avert the type of insurance crises we experienced
with terrorism and pollution coverage. If changes are required, better
to implement them in a proactive, orderly fashion than to walk
headlong into a disruptive, destabilizing felt emergency. Second,
cognizant that insurers do not appear to control this risk especially
well, we should bolster other forms of regulation that do not rely on the
threat of civil liability to create the incentives necessary for harm
reduction.

95

Kunreuther & Pauly, supra note 79, at 19; see Cass R. Sunstein, Terrorism and Probability
Neglect, 26 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 121 (2003).
96
KUNREUTHER ET AL., supra note 67, at 221; accord Boardman, supra note 92, at 786–87.
97
KUNREUTHER ET AL., supra note 67, at 221.
98
See Benjamin J. Richardson, Mandating Environmental Liability Insurance, 12 DUKE
ENVT’L L. & POL’Y F. 293 (2002).
99
Telephone Interview with Commercial Insurer C, supra note 84; Telephone Interview with
Commercial Insurer D, supra note 44. Liability insurance tends to follow an “underwriting cycle”
in which “premiums and restrictions on coverage . . . rise and fall as insurers tighten their
standards in response to the loss of capital”—called a “hard market”—“or, alternately, loosen their
standards in order to maintain or grow market share when new capital enters the market”—a
“soft market.” See TOM BAKER & SEAN J. GRIFFITH, ENSURING CORPORATE MISCONDUCT: HOW
LIABILITY INSURANCE UNDERMINES SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION 55 (2010).
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1. Improving insurance.
This section considers two commonplace insurance devices that
might allow insurers to gauge the risk of wrongful convictions more
accurately: feature rating (rather than experience rating) and claimsmade coverage (rather than occurrence-based coverage).
a. Experience rating vs. feature rating
Insurers use two principal techniques to tailor rates for their
policyholders: experience rating and feature rating.100 Experience rating
uses the insured’s history of past losses—its “loss experience”—during
some designated period (say, five years) to calculate current premiums.
Feature rating instead relies on the insured’s individual risk
characteristics. (Experience rating might raise Richard’s auto premium
because Richard had an accident last year; feature rating because
Richard is only nineteen years old and young drivers are accidentprone.) Because wrongful convictions are a low-probability, long-tail
risk, insurers lack the experience base necessary to do experience
rating well.
As far as I can tell, however, insurers are not feature rating based
on the risk characteristics known to affect the likelihood of wrongful
convictions. For example, insurers could—but, to my knowledge, do
not—raise rates for agencies that fail to videotape interrogations (to
help avoid false or coerced confessions) or use double-blind lineup
procedures (to reduce the danger of erroneous eyewitness
identifications).101 To facilitate reform, insurance regulators could work
with state attorneys general or other law enforcement experts to devise
a list of risk-related features that underwriters should (or must)
consider when setting rates. Insurers might combine a feature-rating
approach with “sub-limits” capping the amount of coverage available
for wrongful conviction claims, which alerts the insured municipalities
to the gravity of the perceived risk.
b. Occurrence vs. claims-made coverage
Even feature-rated premiums, however, may not be accurate
enough to encourage optimal loss prevention and ensure insurer
stability. There is an additional, somewhat more drastic step insurers
might take. I have assumed, so far, that police liability coverage is
100

For descriptions of the two approaches, see ABRAHAM, supra note 70, at 71–74.
See Garrett, supra note 21, at 103–04 (discussing these and other reforms to reduce the
risk of wrongful convictions).
101
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offered, as has been the general (though not exclusive) tradition, on an
occurrence basis.102 “Occurrence policies cover liability for activities
that take place during the policy period, regardless of when a suit that
seeks to impose liability for these activities is filed.”103 Policyholders
tend to like this feature, but it makes pricing very difficult, especially
for long-tail risks. Pricing occurrence coverage requires insurers “to
charge in the present for all the eventual results of present
activities.”104 The principal alternative form of liability coverage is the
claims-made policy. “[C]laims-made policies insure against liability for
claims that are filed during the policy year” that arise out of activities
occurring after a specified retroactive date.105 That is, a “claims-made
policy provides coverage during the policy year for injuries caused by
activities occurring in the past.”106 And “[b]ecause the insurer need not
predict long-term claim exposure, claims-made policies can be priced
more confidently than occurrence policies.”107 In fact, claims-made
policies were first introduced when “concern over the difficulty of
predicting the scope of long-tail liabilities became pronounced.”108
More accurate pricing, while generally beneficial, may not
translate straightforwardly into better loss prevention. “Although the
shift from occurrence to claims-made coverage solves many of the
insurance industry’s prediction problems,” Kenneth Abraham explains,
“it does little to remove the obstacles to thorough cost internalization. If
anything, such a shift may be a step in the opposite direction.”109 This
is because a “claims-made premium increase reflects only the
additional costs anticipated this year as a result of past activities,”

102
A 1991 study reported that 61.6% of law enforcement liability policies were occurrencebased. ICMA & WYATT CO., LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS LIABILITY INSURANCE: CURRENT
STATUS—1991, at 6 (1991). A more recent publication states that claims-made forms are now more
common, but the basis for this assertion is not made plain. See ALBERT P. AMATO, REINSURANCE
REFERENCE GUIDE 117 (2012).
103
ABRAHAM, supra note 70, at 49–50.
104
Id. at 50.
105
Id.
106
Id.
107
Id.
108
KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, INSURANCE LAW AND REGULATION 622 (5th ed. 2010); see also Jaap
Spier, Long Tail (Liability) Risks and Claims Made Policies, 23 GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK & INS.
152 (1998). More generally, claims-made policies work well to reduce the problem of insuring
correlated risk. See Doherty & Dionne, supra note 63, at 198; see also Neil A. Doherty, The Design
of Insurance Contracts When Liability Rules Are Unstable, 58 J. RISK & INS. 227 (1991). Municipal
risk pools, which are essentially small mutual insurers, may have less need to use a claims-made
policy, as the mutual form may accomplish similar objectives. See Doherty & Dionne, supra note
63, at 196–97.
109
ABRAHAM, supra note 70, at 50.
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which “can send incomplete and imprecise messages to insureds.”110
Abraham continues: “In contrast, an increase in occurrence premiums
is a message about the future costs of this year’s activities.”111 The fear
is that “a claims-made pricing system may induce an enterprise to
underestimate the cost of prospective liability as compared to the cost
of an investment in loss prevention that would avoid some of that
liability.”112
That is not to say, of course, that a claims-made insured is without
any incentive for careful behavior—it is “always at risk that its
coverage will not be renewed because of unsafe operations, and that it
will be exposed thereafter to claims that have not yet been reported.”113
In any event, and despite the drawback just mentioned, the gains from
more accurate pricing may justify a shift to claims-made coverage. In
particular, insurers could segregate coverage for wrongful conviction
claims and write that portion alone on a claims-made basis, continuing
to write the rest of the police liability policy on an occurrence basis if
the municipality prefers.114
2. Complementing insurance.
Even were insurers to adopt all of my proposals, I would remain
skeptical about just how well they could regulate the risk of wrongful
convictions. There is a need here for a more active government
presence—a vessel into which we might funnel some of the reform
efforts presently focused on the use of force.115 Fortunately, as I
mentioned in passing above, we know a fair amount about a set of
policies with promise to reduce the risk of wrongful convictions.116
There are numerous ways to encourage adoption of these policies. Oldfashioned political lobbying has more promise than one might think;
110

Id.; see also Katzman, supra note 69, at 88 (asserting that, under claims-made policies,
“current premiums are not easily affected by current risk management practices”).
111
ABRAHAM, supra note 70, at 50.
112
Id.
113
Id. at 51.
114
See Telephone Interview with Commercial Insurer D, supra note 44; cf. Katzman, supra
note 69, at 87 (describing how environmental impairment liability is excluded from occurrencebased general liability policies and written separately on a claims-made basis).
115
See Lempert, supra note 82, at 385 (arguing that government planning and regulation is
necessary to control low-probability, high-consequence events).
116
See, e.g., GOULD ET AL., supra note 59, at 97–101; INT’L ASS’N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE &
OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL SUMMIT ON WRONGFUL
CONVICTIONS: BUILDING A SYSTEMIC APPROACH TO PREVENT WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS (2013),
http: //www.innocenceproject.org /files/imported/wrongful_
convictions_summit_report_2013.pdf [https: //perma.cc /Y3NW-HTTF]; Garrett, supra note 21, at
103–06 (detailing reforms and describing them as “inexpensive and easy to adopt”).
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states have gradually adopted meaningful reforms concerning
interrogation, eyewitness lineups, and other critical stages of the
criminal process.117 Reorienting some of our constitutional criminal
procedure doctrine from individual to systemic issues—that is, making
a criminal defendant’s constitutional claim turn in part on the systemic
measures the prosecuting jurisdiction has taken to safeguard the
underlying constitutional principle—is one way to support and foster
these political reforms.118 Another might be Congress’ spending power.
Congress could reduce federal law enforcement funding to jurisdictions
that have not yet implemented best practices to prevent wrongful
convictions;119 in theory, the moneys not disbursed could even pour into
a fund to help compensate exonerees. Nor should we stop with the basic
set of established reform proposals. Why not take a page from the
financial-crisis literature and try to develop an early warning system to
anticipate wrongful convictions and mitigate the damage from them?120
If insurers substantially improve their ability to reduce the risk of
wrongful convictions, these public regulatory mechanisms may recede
in importance. But until that time, the case for intensified government
intervention is strong.
IV. LOW-DOLLAR, SHORT-TAIL
Low-dollar, short-tail claims are the bread and butter of
constitutional criminal procedure litigation. That is, many
constitutional violations in the criminal process cause some immediate
harm, but not one the legal system deems compensable to any
significant extent.121 This is because deprivation of a constitutional

117

See Rappaport, supra note 8, at 252–54.
See generally id.
119
Cf. Kami Chavis Simmons, Cooperative Federalism and Police Reform: Using
Congressional Spending Power To Promote Police Accountability, 62 ALA. L. REV. 351 (2011).
120
See, e.g., Matthieu Bussière & Marcel Fratzscher, Low Probability, High Impact: Policy
Making and Extreme Events, 30 J. POL’Y MODELING 111 (2008). To some extent, we see this
occasionally already. See, e.g., Jess Bidgood, Massachusetts Justices Clear Way for New Trials in
Cases Chemist May Have Tainted, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 2015, at A11 (describing decision to allow
thousands of defendants whose cases may have been tainted by a state chemist’s work to seek new
trials); Steve Mills & Ken Armstrong, Hard Calls Face Ryan in Death Row Review, CHI. TRIB.,
Mar. 5, 2002 (describing the Illinois governor’s pledge to review the cases of all 159 death row
inmates due partly to concerns about wrongful convictions stemming from systemic flaws).
121
See RONALD JAY ALLEN ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: INVESTIGATION AND RIGHT TO
COUNSEL 337 (3d ed. 2016) (“The typical Fourth Amendment case—say, a gratuitous frisk or car
search—does not involve the kind of physical injury or property damage that would translate into
significant money damages . . . .”).
118
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right, in itself, is compensable only by nominal damages.122 To exceed
nominal damages, a plaintiff must demonstrate some separate,
compensable harm, like a physical injury or loss of wages.123 Many
plaintiffs cannot make this showing.
Consider some familiar examples. Even a brief investigatory stop,
especially if accompanied by a frisk, may intrude significantly on
privacy and dignity interests the Fourth Amendment is said to
protect.124 Where the stop is not justified by reasonable suspicion, the
Constitution forbids it.125 Yet no damages are due for an unjustified
stop, without more. Similarly, a “bare” Miranda violation—the failure
to give Miranda warnings before conducting a custodial interrogation—
is not compensable at all.126
What this means is that insurers have little reason to fear paying
out on claims stemming from such mine-run violations, and thus little
incentive to expend resources to prevent them. Three additional facts
bolster this conclusion. First, although attorney fees provisions of the
federal civil rights statutes were enacted partly to overcome plaintiffs’
financial disincentives to suit,127 fees are likely to be paltry—or even
waived in settlement—when a plaintiff recovers only nominal

122

See Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 308 (1986) (holding that
“damages based on the abstract ‘value’ or ‘importance’ of constitutional rights are not a
permissible element of compensatory damages”).
123
Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 248, 263–67 (1978) (holding that, “in the absence of proof of
actual injury. . . only nominal damages” are due for a procedural due process violation).
124
See, e.g., Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 613–14 (1989) (stating that “the
[Fourth] Amendment guarantees the privacy, dignity, and security of persons against certain
arbitrary and invasive acts by officers of the Government or those acting at their direction”).
Ironically, in the very decision that condoned the stop-and-frisk maneuver, laying the groundwork
for controversial “order maintenance” policing programs, the Supreme Court articulated quite
sharply the personal harms a frisk inflicts:
[I]t is nothing less than sheer torture of the English language to suggest that a careful
exploration of the outer surfaces of a person’s clothing all over his or her body in an
attempt to find weapons is not a “search.” Moreover, it is simply fantastic to urge that
such a procedure performed in public by a policeman while the citizen stands helpless,
perhaps facing a wall with his hands raised, is a “petty indignity.” It is a serious
intrusion upon the sanctity of the person, which may inflict great indignity and arouse
strong resentment, and it is not to be undertaken lightly.
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16–17 (1968) (footnote omitted).
125
Terry, 392 U.S. at 20–22.
126
Technically, a Miranda violation is not itself a constitutional violation. See Chavez v.
Martinez, 538 U.S. 760 (2003). But even if it were, it is hard to see why damages would be more
than nominal.
127
See Robert V. Percival & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Role of Attorney Fee Shifting in Public
Interest Litigation, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 233, 239–41 (1984).
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damages.128 Second, although, in theory, defense costs in suits for
injunctive relief could be substantial enough to justify insurer lossprevention efforts, standing doctrine makes it extremely difficult for
plaintiffs to seek injunctions.129 Moreover, many police liability policies
cover only damages claims.130 And third, some—maybe many—policies
contain a deductible or self-insured retention that effectively allocates
to the municipality losses for claims below a specified attachment
point.131 An occasional Terry claim resulting in a modest damages
payment may never even touch the insurer.
Insurers do not disregard these claims entirely. Some insurers—
especially municipal risk pools, which are owned by their policy-holding
member municipalities—see one of their roles as promoting police
professionalism. Reducing the number of Terry or Miranda violations
could support this goal.132 And where a plaintiff is able to make a
lawsuit financially viable—such as by obtaining pro bono
representation by an interested organization—defense costs might be
substantial even where damages are not. Perhaps most important,
“everyday” violations, even if not themselves compensable, may ground
claims of more egregious conduct that are compensable. Although a
brief (unlawful) Terry stop, for example, likely causes no compensable
harm, a prolonged one, or one accompanied by abusive language or
conduct, might. Insurers thus have some incentive to make sure their
agencies are generally following Terry. Similarly, although a bare
Miranda violation is non-compensable, it may help support a
compensable claim of outrageous conduct that violates due process.133
128

See Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 114–15 (1992) (holding that, when recovery of damages
is the purpose of a suit, the fee award should depend on “the amount of damages awarded as
compared to the amount sought,” and that plaintiffs who seek compensatory damages but receive
only nominal damages “often” should receive “no attorney’s fees at all” (quoting City of Riverside v.
Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 585 (Powell, J., concurring in judgment))). Notwithstanding Farrar, “there
are circumstances where a judgment of nominal damages will support an award of attorneys’ fees,
based on the vindication of important constitutional rights.” MICHAEL AVERY ET AL., POLICE
MISCONDUCT: LAW AND LITIGATION 974 (3d ed. 2015). Even so, defendants are permitted to
condition settlement of civil rights cases on the waiver or reduction of attorney fees, which, by
some accounts, has “destroyed section 1983 as a remedy for civil rights plaintiffs with only modest
damages.” Reingold, supra note 3, at 4.
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See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362
(1976); O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974).
130
See, e.g., Nat’l Cas. Co., supra note 17, at 2 (excluding from coverage “‘claim(s),’ demands,
or actions seeking relief or redress in any form other than monetary damages”).
131
See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Commercial Insurer A, supra note 41 (stressing
importance of deductibles and self-insured retentions for effective risk management).
132
See, e.g., IND. MUN. INS. PROGRAM, supra note 24 (advertising police training videos
covering Terry and Miranda).
133
See, e.g., Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 798–99 (2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
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Still, at the end of the day, insurers will be hard-pressed to
regulate closely an aspect of police conduct that does not, itself,
threaten substantial civil liability. This describes a good deal of plain
vanilla unlawful behavior. And if insurers do not regulate, someone
else has to. For the most part, we rely on criminal defendants to act as
private attorneys general by raising the claims in a defensive posture,
in motions to suppress evidence.134 According to one study, ninety-five
percent of Terry claims are litigated in this fashion.135 We supplement
this with a tiny bit of injunctive litigation136 and a handful of “pattern
or practice” suits by the U.S. Department of Justice under 42 U.S.C.
§ 14141.137 These are useful tools but they are probably insufficient, as
they seem to leave us with underdeterrence, judging by the number of
legal violations we presently experience.138
As I have argued elsewhere, and alluded to above, in my view the
biggest advance that can be made here, within the limits of practicality,
is to reorient some of our constitutional doctrine to focus defendants’
claims on systemic rather than (or in addition to) individual issues.139
The courts in this model would not be first-order regulators,
announcing conduct rules for cops on the street to follow, but secondorder regulators, articulating constitutional principles for political
policymakers to operationalize as they craft the conduct rules that
govern the police. Suppression hearings would then focus not only on
the isolated conduct of the individual officers alleged to have acted
illegally, but also on the steps that policymakers took—both before and
after the challenged conduct—to channel discretion and encourage law
compliance. The basic theory is to address the systemic
underdeterrence of police wrongdoing by having the courts pressure
political actors to prevent and punish misconduct rather than try to
catch it all themselves. I would not expect this systemic turn to
eradicate the targeted misconduct, but I do think it could improve upon
the status quo.
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See generally Meltzer, supra note 14.
Leong, supra note 13, at 425.
136
See, e.g., Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
137
For a proposal on how to extract the greatest returns from the limited resources available
for § 14141 litigation, see Rachel A. Harmon, Promoting Civil Rights Through Proactive Policing
Reform, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2009).
138
See, e.g., Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 559–60 (finding that, during an eight-year period in
New York City, “at least 200,000 stops were made without reasonable suspicion,” and “[t]he actual
number of stops lacking reasonable suspicion was likely far higher”).
139
See generally Rappaport, supra note 8.
135
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V. LOW-DOLLAR, LONG-TAIL
As a doctrinal matter, the Constitution forbids racial profiling—
targeting an individual for suspicion of crime because of his race.140
Payouts on profiling claims, however, while more than nominal, are
typically insubstantial. In one recent case, for example, a Kashmiri
man stopped at subway checkpoints twenty-one times by the New York
City police settled for $10,001,141 a fraction of the deductible many
insured municipalities carry.142 Other, similar examples are not hard to
find.143 Although the media occasionally report high-dollar judgments
and settlements in racial profiling cases, those cases always involve, as
far as I can tell, some separate compensable harm from police violence
or other aggravating conduct.144 As a result, despite substantial
evidence of discrimination on the roadways and elsewhere,145 insurers
have little incentive to expend resources combatting “mere” racial
profiling.146
As before, this is not to say that insurers pay no attention to racial
profiling. Discrimination can factor into broader, more costly
occurrences like the racially motivated use of force. In an effort to
manage this risk, some insurers have begun to consider the racial and
ethnic diversity of the police force at underwriting or rating.147 Others
140

See, e.g., Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (stating that “the Constitution
prohibits selective enforcement of the law based on considerations such as race”).
141
Stipulation and Order of Settlement and Discontinuance at 2, Sultan v. Kelly, No. 09-CV00698 (RJD) (RER) (E.D.N.Y. June 30, 2009).
142
Telephone Interview with Commercial Insurer D, supra note 44 (asserting that $100,000 is
a common self-insured retention among his company’s policyholders).
143
See, e.g., Settlement Agreement at 1–2, Md. State Conf. of NAACP Branches v. Md. State
Police, No. FPS-98-1098 (D. Md. Apr. 3, 2008) (agreeing to settle the claims of six plaintiffs for
$300,000 total); Settlement Agreement at 7, Wilkins v. Md. State Police, No. MJG-93-468 (D. Md.
Jan. 5, 1995) (settling the claims of four plaintiffs for $12,500 per plaintiff ); ACLU, ACLU of NJ
Wins $775,000 for Victims of Racial Profiling by State Troopers (Jan. 13, 2003),
https: //www.aclu.org /news/aclu-nj-wins-775000-victims-racial-profiling-state-troopers
[https: //
perma.cc /3ZDZ-URSF] (awarding majority of plaintiffs around $31,000 each).
144
See, e.g., Gousse v. City of Los Angeles, No. B174896, 2007 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 2882
(Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 10, 2007) (affirming trial court’s decision to grant a new trial on damages after
a jury awarded $33,000,000 to a urological surgeon who claimed lost earning capacity, among
other damages); ACLU, supra note 143 (reporting having settled claims of two plaintiffs who were
beaten and held at gunpoint for $200,000 each).
145
See, e.g., THE LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE, RESTORING A NATIONAL CONSENSUS: THE NEED
TO END RACIAL PROFILING IN AMERICA (Mar. 2011), http: //www.civilrights.org /publications/
reports/racial-profiling2011/racial_profiling2011.pdf [https: //perma.cc /4EUN-JNWN] (collecting
evidence); Ian Ayres, Racial Profiling in L.A.: The Numbers Don’t Lie, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2008.
146
Recall that most policies do not cover defense against suits for declaratory and injunctive
relief. See supra note 129.
147
Susan Kostro, Police Excessive Force Raises Liability Risk Scrutiny, IRONSHORE
(Oct. 1, 2015), http: //www.ironshore.com/blog /police-excessive-force-raises-liability-risk-scrutiny
[https: //perma.cc /RFP7-4PUG].
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encourage departments to train officers on confronting implicit racial
bias.148 Still, racial profiling does not make the risk manager’s toptwelve list of “high risk/critical tasks.”149
One commonsense way to focus additional attention on racial
profiling would be to lobby for loftier damages. Higher payouts would
better reflect the dignitary harms racial profiling inflicts and create
stronger financial incentives for municipalities—and their insurers—to
beef up efforts to prevent profiling. This strategy would likely improve
upon the status quo, yet substantial impediments to effective
regulation-by-insurance would remain. One such impediment is that
racial profiling claims frequently have longer tails than one might
expect.
To be sure, an individual who is profiled by the police might
personally suspect (or even know) as much immediately. (The same is
true, of course, of a wrongfully convicted defendant who knows he is
innocent.) But from a risk management perspective, the more
important question is when the individual can prove that he has been
profiled, i.e., when he is likely to sue. And it turns out that racial
profiling claims frequently lie dormant for years. Why? In all but the
rarest cases that involve direct evidence of discriminatory intent,150 a
colorable racial profiling claim must, to trigger Fourteenth Amendment
protections, marshal statistical evidence from a broad sample of other
incidents.151 This can make it impossible to prove that racial profiling is
happening right when it first occurs—only situating the challenged
conduct within the context of future (or future-disclosed) police
activities will reveal its discriminatory nature. To reflect this reality, at
least some courts have applied the “discovery rule” and held that a

148

Telephone Interview with Risk Pool D, supra note 27; Telephone Interview with Risk Pool
E, supra note 89.
149
GALLAGHER, supra note 19, at 52; see also GIROD, supra note 19, at 163 (declining to list
racial profiling among fourteen “most common [types of] ‘actionable conduct’ involving civil rights
liability” for police).
150
See, e.g., Marshall v. Columbia Lea Regional Hosp., 345 F.3d 1157, 1168 (10th Cir. 2003).
151
See, e.g., id. (“In general, the absence of an overtly discriminatory policy or of direct
evidence of police motivation results in most claims being based on statistical comparisons
between the number of black or other minority Americans stopped or arrested and their
percentage in some measure of the relevant population.”); David Rudovsky, Litigating Civil Rights
Cases to Reform Racially Biased Criminal Justice Practices, 39 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 97, 109–
12 (2007) (“[W]here discrimination is sufficiently ‘clandestine and covert,’ statistical evidence of a
discriminatory pattern is the ‘only available avenue of proof.’” (quoting Int’l Bd. of Teamsters v.
United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339 n.20 (1977))); Brian L. Withrow & Jeffrey Doug Dailey, Racial
Profiling Litigation: Current Status and Emerging Controversies, 28 J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 122,
130 (2012). Fourth Amendment doctrine regards discriminatory intent as irrelevant; as long as the
police have sufficient cause to, say, pull over a vehicle, it matters not whether the driver’s race
supplies their true motive for the stop. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996).
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racial profiling cause of action does not accrue until the injured party
discovers, or reasonably should have discovered, the basis for an
actionable claim. The Third Circuit, for example, delayed accrual in one
case for eleven years, until the State of New Jersey released documents
revealing a statewide practice of racially selective law enforcement,
“information vital to [the plaintiff ’s] selective-enforcement claim.”152
More generally, there is an incentive for racial profiling claimants
to delay pursuing their claims; many cases will gain strength as time
passes and more data roll in. The incentive may well be the opposite in
the use-of-force context: sue quickly while witnesses’ memories are
fresh. In addition, both plaintiffs and courts routinely rely on data from
outside the limitations period to inform the legality of more recent
activity, which means that expiration of the statute of limitations does
not signal the same degree of repose for insurers that it might in, say,
the use-of-force setting.153 To put the point slightly differently, the
factual and evidentiary basis for a racial profiling lawsuit may ripen for
years without alerting insurers to the need to collect premiums and
build reserves to cover any eventual payout.
To give one example, the plaintiffs in a major racial profiling
lawsuit in California—a class of individuals whom the police had
stopped beginning in 1998—alleged that the California Highway Patrol
(CHP) had “long relied upon race and ethnicity in conducting stops,
detentions, interrogations and searches of motorists” as part of an
“unabated, continuing pattern and practice of discrimination” that had
intensified in recent years.154 The challenged conduct dated back to at
least the late 1980s, when the CHP became involved in “Operation
Pipeline,” a federally funded drug interdiction program the plaintiffs
described as a “roving program of discrimination.”155 Yet the plaintiffs
did not sue until 1999, the year California’s Joint Legislative Task
Force on Government Oversight released a report, based on a review of
thousands of CHP records, finding that Operation Pipeline
discriminated against motorists of color.156
152

Dique v. N.J. State Police, 603 F.3d 181, 184 (3d Cir. 2010).
See, e.g., Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 558–60, 572 n.100, 590 (S.D.N.Y.
2013) (relying, in a lawsuit filed in 2008, on data and expert analysis reaching to January 2004, a
state attorney general report from 1999, and evidence of “more than a decade” of institutional
indifference); Floyd v. City of New York, 283 F.R.D. 153, 160 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (certifying a class
covering individuals stopped by police beginning in 2005); Complaint at 9–13, Floyd v. City of New
York, No. 08 Civ. 1034 (SAS) (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2008) (connecting present-day allegations to
history of police activity dating to the 1970s).
154
First Amended Complaint at 6, 16, Rodriguez v. Cal. Hwy. Patrol, No. 5:99-CV-20895-JF
(N.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 1999).
155
Id. at 6–7.
156
Id. at 7.
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Two implications follow. First, even if racial profiling triggered
heavier damages, insurers would face substantial challenges in pricing
and managing the risk. This is true for the reasons discussed in Part
III—namely, that the long tail of liability heightens the degree of
correlation among the covered risks, tempts insurers to externalize to
the future, and creates uncertainty about the number and magnitude of
claims insurers should anticipate.157 Consider, for example, the effects
of a statute easing the burden of proof for racial profiling plaintiffs,
which would buoy a large number of outstanding claims
simultaneously, upending insurers’ financial planning.
Second, criminal defendants are poorly situated to serve as private
attorneys general, at least relative to how well they can play that role
for claims with shorter tails. In many cases, present proof of
discriminatory intent—through statistical analysis of prior incidents—
will simply be unavailable when the defendant is charged, even though
proof may bubble up in patterns of future police activity. But even
where present proof is theoretically available—and where defense
resources exist to analyze and present it—pretrial detention creates
strong incentives for defendants to resolve their cases as quickly as
possible, sooner than will allow for the development of a relatively
complex racial profiling claim.158 Stingy discovery standards further
hamstring criminal defendants’ efforts to prove profiling.159 Indeed, I
could find no criminal case in which a defendant has prevailed on a
racial profiling defense under federal law.160
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See supra pp. 386–92.
See, e.g., Nick Pinto, The Bail Trap, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Aug. 13, 2015, at MM38.
159
See Armstrong v. United States, 517 U.S. 456 (1996) (denying defendants discovery on
selective prosecution claims unless they can show that the government declined to prosecute
similarly situated suspects of other races). Courts are divided on whether (and how) the Armstrong
standard applies in the selective enforcement (i.e., policing) context. See JODY FEDER, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., RL31130, RACIAL PROFILING: LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 6–9 (2012).
160
My research uncovered no complete victories by criminal defendants based on racial
profiling under either state or federal law. New Jersey courts have granted motions to suppress
evidence based on state-law equal protection violations, though even these partial victories are
rare. See, e.g., State v. Segars, 799 A.2d 541, 552 (N.J. 2002) (“This is a very unusual case.
Without Officer Williams’s repudiated testimony, the evidence produced by Segars that Officer
Williams saw him prior to the MDT check would have been completely inadequate to support an
inference of discriminatory enforcement.”); State v. Soto, 734 A.2d 350 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1996); see
also David A. Harris, Racial Profiling Redux, 22 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 73, 77–79 (2003)
(characterizing as unsurprising the “lack of litigation success in suits against racial profiling,” and
crediting “unusual circumstances” for successes in Soto and a famous civil case); Lewis R. Katz,
“Lonesome Road”: Driving Without the Fourth Amendment, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1413, 1427
(2013) (“Only New Jersey courts have granted motions to suppress in Fourteenth Amendment
equal protection claims, based on their interpretation of the New Jersey Constitution.” (footnote
omitted)).
158
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It appears, therefore, that neither civil plaintiffs—with liability
filtered through insurance—nor criminal defendants, acting as private
attorneys general, show much promise in the fight against racial
profiling. A relatively small amount of injunctive-relief litigation has
helped call attention to the problem, and may reduce the frequency of
profiling in the targeted jurisdictions, but it seems unlikely to be a
general solution.161 In light of these realities, it would be wise to shift
our attention from the judicial forum to political ones. This is not a
novel suggestion; the work is already underway. According to one
report, thirty states have enacted some form of ban on racial profiling,
and seventeen also forbid pretextual traffic stops. Eighteen require
mandatory data collection for all stops and searches.162 The most recent
efforts pin hope on cutting-edge reforms like implicit bias training
(“debiasing”) and body-worn cameras.163 Increasing the diversity of
police forces may help too.164 At the national level, federal policy
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See, e.g., Melendres v. Arpaio, 784 F.3d 1254 (9th Cir. 2015) (upholding part of a
permanent injunction); Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 668 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (entering a
permanent injunction); see also Arnold v. Ariz. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, No. CV–01–1463–PHX–LOA,
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53315 (D. Ariz. July 31, 2006) (affirming a settlement agreement containing
extensive prospective relief, including modifications to police procedures and training
requirements); In re Cincinnati Policing, 209 F.R.D. 395 (S.D. Ohio 2002) (similar). On the general
difficulty of litigating racial profiling claims effectively, see DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE
AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 40 (1999); Albert W. Alschuler, Racial
Profiling and the Constitution, 2002 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 163, 245, 248; Harris, supra note 160, at 78;
Kevin R. Johnson, Racial Profiling in America, 98 GEO. L.J. 1005, 1069, 1069 n.394 (2011); Kami
Chavis Simmons, Beginning To End Racial Profiling: Definitive Solutions to an Elusive Problem,
18 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 25, 37 (2011).
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NAACP, BORN SUSPECT: STOP-AND-FRISK ABUSES AND THE CONTINUED FIGHT
TO END RACIAL PROFILING IN AMERICA 19 (Sept. 2014), http: //action.naacp.org /page/-/
Criminal%20Justice/Born_Suspect_Report_final_web.pdf [https: //perma.cc /T54T-KVU2].
163
Id. at Appx. II (listing, among essential components of an effective racial profiling law,
“funds for periodically retraining officers and installing in-car video cameras, body-worn cameras,
and gun cameras”); see L. Song Richardson, Police Racial Violence: Lessons From Social
Psychology, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 2961, 2975–76 (2015) (describing the Fair and Impartial Policing
program, which educates agencies about implicit bias); Robert J. Smith, Keynote Address,
Reducing Racially Disparate Policing Outcomes: Is Implicit Bias Training the Answer?, 37 HAW. L.
REV. 295, 300 (2015) (describing implicit bias training as an “ascendant idea in policing and
scholarly circles” and providing citations); Implicit Bias, NAT’L INITIATIVE FOR BUILDING CMTY.
TRUST & JUST., http: //trustandjustice.org /resources/intervention/implicit-bias [https: //perma.cc /
T8XH-Y2A8] (last visited Dec. 19, 2015) (discussing implicit bias interventions and collecting
academic research); Press Release, State of Cal. Dep’t of Justice, Attorney General Kamala D.
Harris Kicks Off First-of-its-Kind Law Enforcement Training on Implicit Bias & Procedural
Justice (Nov. 17, 2015), https: //oag.ca.gov/news/press-releases/attorney-general-kamala-d-harriskicks-first-its-kind-law-enforcement-training [https: //perma.cc /ZJ8T-XBM5].
164
See, e.g., John J. Donohue III & Steven D. Levitt, The Impact of Race on Policing and
Arrests, 44 J.L. & ECON. 367, 371 & tbl. 2 (2001) (finding that “an increase in the number of white
police is associated with more arrests of minorities but little change in white arrests,” while “an
increase in minority officers is associated with more white arrests but not more minority arrests”);
Joscha Legewi & Jeffrey Fagan, Group Threat, Police Officer Diversity and the Deadly Use of Force
(Columbia Law Sch. Pub. Law Research Paper No. 14-512, 2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
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prohibits U.S. agents from profiling, although the policy has some
loopholes, and efforts to enact broader, federal legislation have
faltered.165 A recent report by the President’s Task Force on 21st
Century Policing urges local agencies to adopt their own policies
banning profiling.166 There is a supportive role for doctrine to play as
well: The Court’s current, hands-off approach to stamping out
discriminatory motive could become a sort of doctrinal carrot—a “safe
harbor” available only to jurisdictions that have implemented adequate
safeguards to prevent discrimination.167
There is one major sticking point I have obscured, however: We
have little idea which, if any, of these leading reform proposals actually
work.168 While mustering political will to enact reforms is an important
step toward change, there will be no change if the reforms enacted turn
out to be ineffective. This field is ripe with opportunity for researchers
who can figure out how to measure the effects of our “leading solutions”
to the problem of racial profiling.

papers.cfm?abstract_id=2778692 (finding that a diverse police force reduces the influence of group
threat, lowering the number of officer-involved killings of African Americans); see also LORIE
FRIDELL ET AL., RACIALLY BIASED POLICING: A PRINCIPLED RESPONSE 68–78 (2008) (arguing that
hiring a racially diverse police force can help reduce racial bias in policing); Robert J. Friedrich,
Police Use of Force: Individuals, Situations, and Organizations, 452 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. &
SOC. SCI. 82, 90 (1980) (finding that biracial teams of partners use less force). Overall, however,
the empirical evidence regarding the performance effects of having a diverse police force is mixed.
See David A. Sklansky, Not Your Father’s Police Department: Making Sense of the New
Demographics of Law Enforcement, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1209, 1224–25, 1229, 1230
(2006) (reviewing studies).
165
See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, GUIDANCE FOR FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES
REGARDING THE USE OF RACE, ETHNICITY, GENDER, NATIONAL ORIGIN, RELIGION, SEXUAL
ORIENTATION, OR GENDER IDENTITY (2014); see also NAACP, supra note 162, at 18–19 (describing
repeated attempts to pass federal legislation); Letter from The Leadership Conference to Barack
Obama, President of the U.S. (Feb. 24, 2015), http: //civilrightsdocs.info/pdf/Sign-On-Letter-ReDOJ-Guidance-Revisions.pdf [https: //perma.cc /AR6Q-8EEH] (conveying the “serious concerns” of
eighty public interest groups about the DOJ’s 2014 guidance).
166
PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING, FINAL REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S
TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING 28 (2015).
167
See Rappaport, supra note 8, at 269.
168
See, e.g., Smith, supra note 163, at 302 (noting that, despite the growing popularity of
implicit bias training, when it comes to efficacy, “empirical support is lacking”); Jack Glaser, How
to Reduce Racial Profiling, GREATER GOOD (May 28, 2015) http: //greatergood.berkeley.edu/article/
item/how_reduce_racial_profiling [https: //perma.cc /7UQW-T5ZA] (maintaining that, “to date,
research has yet to uncover a straightforward method that can lastingly mitigate implicit biases”
that result in racial profiling).
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VI. CONCLUSION
To tame police misconduct, we must first understand the nature of
the beast. Careful attention to the incentives of, and constraints on,
some of the major players in policing reveals not one but many species
of misconduct. These players include the constitutional rights-holders—
i.e., the victims of misconduct, on whom we rely to serve as private
attorneys general—as well as the intermediary institutions, like
insurers, that help operationalize the deterrent ambitions of our civil
liability regime. Some misconduct inflicts harms the legal system
compensates meaningfully; some inflicts harms that, even if
normatively serious, the system leaves largely unremedied. Some legal
injuries manifest immediately; others manifest only after significant
delay. These distinctions make it unlikely that any one solution, or any
single remedial regime, will work best to reduce police misconduct
across the board. Given these truths, police reformers ought to start
thinking like foxes rather than hedgehogs.169
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See ISAIAH BERLIN, THE HEDGEHOG AND THE FOX 1 (Henry Hardy ed., Princeton Univ.
Press 2013) (1953) (“The fox knows many things, but the hedgehog knows one big thing.”).

